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CHERNYSHEV: NATO SEEKS REARMAMENT, NOT DISARMAMENT

LD201941 Moscow TASS in English 1902 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- By TASS military writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

At a time when the world public is looking at Geneva where conditions have been created thanks to the Soviet side's constructive, dynamic stance for concluding an agreement on scrapping all Soviet and American medium- and shorter-range missiles, a first step in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, there has emerged fresh evidence that NATO is preparing dangerous "surprises" for Europe.

The Soviet-American agreement has not as yet been elaborated, but the North Atlantic alliance is already looking for loopholes which would allow circumvention of the agreement, and is taking measures to reduce it to naught.

The Pentagon chief, Caspar Weinberger, presented at the recent session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group an assortment of new weaponry systems allegedly required by the West should the "zero-zero" option become a reality.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Gen. John Galvin of the U.S. said that the "deterrence potential" would be preserved if NATO improved the situation with airborne nuclear weapons.

Britain's Defence Secretary George Younger made it clear that new American nuclear delivery vehicles could be deployed on British territory.

Any "zero option" needs a replacement, that is rearmament -- such is the creed of those who advocate the preservation of nuclear weapons on both sides of the Atlantic.

What do the NATO plans of so-called compensation for the reduction of nuclear arms in Europe provide for?

Aren't these plans just a trick designed to deceive the Soviet Union?

Firstly, they provide for the deployment of additional nuclear-capable F-111 fighter bombers on the British Isles.

Washington seems to be insisting on the deployment of these aircraft on the territories of other Western European NATO countries as well.

Incidentally, Norway's Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland said the other day that her government refused to provide bases on Norwegian territory for U.S. F-111 fighter bombers.

Secondly, a possibility of deploying nuclear-armed FB-111A medium bombers in some Western European NATO countries, including Britain, is being considered.

It has been proposed to arm F-4 fighter bombers, based in Europe, with shorter-range cruise missiles.

Thirdly, it has been proposed to deploy sea-based cruise missiles under the control of the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

This option providing for Britain becoming a base for cruise-armed submarines, Younger put it bluntly, figured in all papers in potential measurs to fill in the blanks in NATO's "forces of nuclear deterrence."

Fourthly, options are being considered for establishing bases for B-52 bombers armed with airborne cruise missiles in Britain, Spain or Turkey.

Finally, a possibility of the broad introduction of land-based "non-nuclear" cruise missiles in Europe is being examined.

The assortment is indeed very wide: what is offered instead of a real reduction in the level of nuclear confrontation in Europe is large-scale unilateral rearmement on the part of NATO.

Only bitter cynics could describe as a genuine disarmament agreement the treaty on scrapping medium- and shorter-range missiles if the NATO countries approve the recommendations on deploying "compensatory" systems of nuclear weapons.

NATO's unilateral rearmament would simply alter the character of nuclear confrontation, rather than really reduce its level in Europe.

All these facts can hardly attest to the sincerity of U.S. and other NATO officials who speak of the possibility of reaching an agreement in Geneva in the near future.

There will be no agreement unless an obstacle is erected in the way of the far-reaching plans of the NATO military to gain unilateral advantages for the North Atlantic bloc at the negotiating table.

IZVESTIYA VIEWS 'REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY' CONCEPT

PM141227 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 87 Morning Edition p 5

[Doctor of Historical Sciences L. Semeyko article: "Instead of Mountains of Arms... On the Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency"; words within slantlines published in boldface; final paragraph is IZVESTIYA note]

[Text] The question of what a state's military power must represent in terms of size, nature, and function is one of the main questions separating the new and old political thinking in the security sphere. The old thinking proceeds in principle from the idea of "the more, the better," the idea that gaining military supremacy over an opponent can almost automatically guarantee a victorious outcome in a potential war.

The new thinking denies this confrontationist approach. It favors a minimum and not a maximum of military might for both sides and favors excluding the idea of seeking a military solution to disputed international problems. This quest is senseless, for with the continuation of the arms race war will increasingly appear to equate with universal destruction.

It will become even more senseless if all states are oriented to exclusively defensive military doctrines -- not only in declarations, but also in actions.

We can pride ourselves on the fact that it is our country that has proclaimed the new political thinking, transforming it from the good intentions of perspicacious scientists and public figures into the directives of a practical policy. The 27th CPSU Congress clearly formulated these directives. The subsequent actions by the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies concretized them both conceptually and, if you like, materially. This is illustrated by our repeated unilateral measures to contain the arms race, our constructive proposals for the creation of an all-embracing system of international security, and the terms of the recently announced Warsaw Pact military doctrine.

Among the most important political directives of the new thinking, special significance attaches to the principle of reasonable sufficiency. It is this concept that is the basis for the construction of the USSR and Warsaw Pact Armed Forces. It makes a large contribution to shaping the socialist countries' approach to reducing military potential and demonstrates the truly defensive thrust of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact and the national doctrines of its member states. Where does the essence of the concept lie?

The /political/ aspect lies in its emphasis on the strictly defensive function of armed forces and their readiness for defense against outside attack and not for attack and aggression: The concept is characterized by the priority given to the political solution of international disputes and the stress on continually reducing the level of military confrontation and on supporting and strengthening strategic stability through strictly monitored arms limitation and reduction of arms to reasonable limits ensuring the interests of reliable defense. The desire for a peaceful and purely peaceful solution of international disputes must be confirmed by the defensive, nonthreatening nature of the entire series of indicators of military potentials' might. The existing disproportion between political directives to strengthen peace and security (there are more than enough of the appropriate declarations today) and the menacing size and nature of military might must be eliminated, irrespective of whether these threats are real or invented.

Indisputably, the creation and maintenance of a particular military might is determined, above all, by interests of security, that is by political aims. However, in any case the size and nature of military might must be reasonable; they must conform to the realities of the nuclear age and have an exclusively defensive thrust.

I am talking about the military-political concept of the socialist community countries and it is not hard to imagine the significance its adoption by the whole international community and, above, all, its adoption by the NATO states would have. This would ensure most completely both mutual (USSR-United States) and universal security and would create an atmosphere of genuine trust in one another.

The concept of reasonable sufficiency is oriented to the future and carries a charge of ideas for long-term action. It may be fully implemented in a nuclear-free world -- with the elimination of nuclear weapons and other types of mass destruction weapons. But, it is necessary to ensure right now the permanent increasingly large-scale reduction of weapons arsenals to the minimum reasonable limits.

The concept's /military/ aspect lies in the fact that specific indicators of military potential must actually confirm the defensive (nonoffensive, nonaggressive) nature of the military doctrines and at the same time ensure reliable security.

What does this mean? Here I think one can discern at least two important criteria.

The first is that the military might of a state or a coalition of states must assure that no one has grounds for fears, even imaginary fears, for their security. This criterion demands reasonable sufficiency exclusively for defense purposes and not an unreasonable surplus of military potential, where a military threat can always be perceived. Here the mere proclamation of one's military doctrine's defensive thrust, as is characteristic of NATO, in particular is not enough. Confirmations of this are needed in terms of the size of the armed forces and their distribution and structure, the nature of their armaments, military activity undertaken and, of course, in terms of constructive actions to reduce the level of military strategic equilibrium. Without this, declarations will remain declarations and mutual suspicions will not only be a permanent feature but will also be capable of causing the swift emergence of crisis situations.

The sufficiency of military potentials is expressed both in terms of the precise quantity and quality of armaments and the troops themselves intended for defense, and also in terms of their structure and stationing. These and other factors must convincingly show the absence of aggressive intentions. In this context the Warsaw Pact countries' doctrinal purpose is of fundamental significance: To implement the reduction in Europe of armed forces and conventional armaments to a level whereby neither of the sides, while ensuring its defense, has the means to suddenly attack the other side or to unleash offensive operations in general. This purpose is indeed revolutionary because it proposes for the first time that both sides mutually reject such a military action such as attack, which is traditionally considered to be fundamental. The proposals for the mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous offensive types of armaments from the zone in which the two sides are directly contiguous and for a reduction in the concentration of armed forces and armaments in this zone to a minimum agreed level are also innovative. This approach is mutually beneficial and once again confirms the need for international recognition and adoption of the principle of reasonable sufficiency.

The second criterion is that military might and combat readiness must be sufficient to permit them not to be taken unawares (let us recall the sad experience of 1941) and, if a hostile attack occurs, to deal the aggressor a crushing rebuff. While the first criterion is aimed at ensuring that the other side has no unwarranted fears, the point of the second is that we and our allies equally want to be spared the sense of an imminent threat looming over us.

Sufficiency does not preclude but, on the contrary, presupposes the presence of strategic parity -- that decisive factor in preventing war. It is necessary to have within the framework of parity a reasonably sufficient military potential capable of reliably ensuring the security of the USSR and its allies. This means that under contemporary conditions we are obliged to have a guaranteed potential for nuclear retaliation designed to prevent an unpunished nuclear attack under any, even the most unfavorable, nuclear attack scenarios. In any situation, an answering strike must unacceptably damage the aggressor. The inevitability of this must discourage him from attack. In turn, sufficiency with regard to conventional weapons means the capability to reliably ensure the collective defense of the socialist community countries.

We want to be spared the sense of an imminent threat, both as a result of the Warsaw Pact's military potential being a sufficiently reliable shield to defend us and by virtue of the NATO bloc actually demonstrating its renunciation of aggression, of the gamble on military supremacy, and of the maintenance and especially the buildup of menacingly large armed forces.

But at the moment, there is no proof that the North Atlantic bloc has embarked on this, the only correct path. Since so much of our security depends on the resolutions and actions of the United States and its allies, our Armed Forces, limits of sufficiency cannot be permanent. We cannot fail to take into consideration the fact that the U.S. Armed Forces' construction is now based not on the concept of reasonable sufficiency but on the concept of military supremacy. We cannot fail to be alarmed at the contradictions in the policy and statements (and this is also policy) of U.S. leaders. Here is an example from President Reagan's speeches. The first (and commendable) statement: "There can be no greater happiness than reaching an agreement that will rid the earth of nuclear weapons for all time," and the second statement (which really chills the soul): "May our adversary go to sleep each night in fear waiting for us to use nuclear weapons." Under these conditions we need special precision in assessing our own capabilities, self-possession, and supreme responsibility in making decisions. But in any case the limits of our Armed Forces' sufficiency must be reasonable and not exceed actual defensive requirements. We do not support the idea of eternal nuclear deterrence just as we resolutely oppose hypocritical, totally unrealistic plans to ensure the creation of a nuclear-free world with the help of SDI. Lasting security can only be guaranteed on the path of consistent disarmament and by reducing military potentials to a reasonable nuclear-free minimum, ensuring the interests of defense. That is precisely how the 27th CPSU Congress put the question.

The /economic/ aspect of the concept under review is obvious. Its implementation means saving the huge means and resources which every state and all mankind need so badly to resolve constructive tasks. The experience of history convincingly confirms that the law of diminishing returns operates in raising the level of military confrontation: increasingly reduced efficiency of arms increments and increasingly large expenditure on them. The situation is obviously absurd. Furthermore the desire for a surplus of military might has inevitably always led to the slowing down of socioeconomic and technological processes. For 400 years the Roman Empire directed its technological achievements above all to military requirements. The result was stagnation in all spheres. The Pentagon is also a kind of huge black hole sucking up the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution and providing practically nothing in exchange. In the opinion of leading U.S. economists, over the past 30 years the military has been responsible for one-half of the instances of U.S. economic backwardness with regard to particular targets. We do not want this practice either for the U.S. or for ourselves, or for anyone else.

The mutual orientation of the USSR and the United States, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, toward reasonable sufficiency of military might would ensure not only accelerated transition from nuclear confrontation to a nuclear-free world and, consequently, the consolidation of mutual and universal security, but also broad scope for resolving the global tasks facing mankind. This is the tremendous importance for all mankind of the military-political concept proclaimed by the Soviet Union and now enshrined in the Warsaw Pact military doctrine.

The author of the article is a leading researcher at the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute. He has written a whole series of works on military-political problems.

'REPERCUSSIONS' PROGRAM ON 'REGIONAL CONFLICTS'

LD201842 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1500 GMT 19 Aug 87

["Repercussions: Regional Conflicts in the Nuclear Age" program, presented by Farid Mustafyevich Seyful-Mulyukov, with deputy USSR Foreign Minister Anatoliy Leonidovich Adamishin; Pavel Yepifanovich Demchenko, PRAVDA editorial board member; Stanislav Nikolayevich Kondrashov, IZVESTIYA political observer and member of the USSR Union of Writers; and Kim Makedonovich Tsagolov, faculty head at Frunze Military Academy, doctor of philosophical sciences; program participants shown seated in a studio -- live]

[Excerpts] [Seyful-Mulyukov] Hello, esteemed viewers. We are meeting once again in the television studio where the live program "Repercussions" is starting right now. The topic of today's program is: Regional Conflicts in the Nuclear Age. We shall tell you about the fears and hopes of Afghanistan and about the events seething in other trouble spots -- the Persian Gulf area, the Middle East, Central America, Southeast Asia, and Africa. [passage omitted]

The Delhi Declaration, which has come to be the manifesto for a nonnuclear world without violence, contains the words: In the nuclear age, it is necessary to restructure international relations so that confrontation is replaced by cooperation, and conflict situations are resolved by peaceful, political, rather than military means.

In today's program we will talk about this specifically, with reference to each trouble spot.

I will introduce those taking part in our program:

USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Leonidovich Adamishin. For many years Anatoliy Leonidovich has been working on various complex international problems, including regional ones. He is directly involved in putting Soviet foreign policy into effect; Pavel Yepifanovich Demchenko, a member of the editorial board of the newspaper PRAVDA. For a number of years he was a correspondent for PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA in various countries of the Arab East. Pavel Yepifanovich is also familiar with the situation in other countries of the developing world, which he has frequently visited. I imagine you know of his articles in PRAVDA about the problems of that world; Stanislav Nikolayevich Kondrashov, political observer of the newspaper IZVESTIYA and a member of the USSR Union of Writers. For many years he worked as a correspondent for the paper, first in New York and then in Washington. You know Stanislav Nikolayevich from his items in IZVESTIYA, his books, and his contributions to "International Panorama"; Kim Makedonovich Tsagolov, a faculty head at the Frunze Military Academy, doctor of philosophical sciences and author of a number of studies on crisis situations. Kim Makedonovich has been to Afghanistan on more than one occasion and is well acquainted with the situation in the country in various spheres and at various levels.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] [passage omitted] Anatoliy Leonidovich. Yuriy Sergeyevich Vinogradov, a steelman in Volgograd, asks those taking part in our program: The Soviet Union is working for the destruction of nuclear weapons and opposes Star Wars, yet at the same time, in various parts of the world, conventional wars, the so-called regional wars, are taking place. What is our attitude toward this? Would you like to answer that?

[Adamishin] The Soviet Union's attitude toward international conflicts, be they existing conflicts or potential ones, can be expressed in simple terms. Our country wants there to be none, and feels that countries and states should settle their disputes not by force of arms but around the negotiating table. This is no slogan. It is a line that is carefully weighed and based on a precise and, I would say, scientific analysis of our modern missile-nuclear-space world, a line that was clearly upheld by the decisions of the 27th party congress.

It might seem that all this is obvious. However, the idea that the Soviet Union has no real interest in resolving conflicts plays quite a large part in the propaganda directed against us. True to its alleged strategy of global confrontation with imperialism, the Soviet Union supposedly feels that the main thing is to spread its influence or to spread the influence of its ideology. It has, after all, put its troops into Afghanistan to ultimately reach warm water ports; it supplies arms, and in large quantities too, they claim, to such countries as Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Frontline States of southern Africa. So, we need to sort this out. I want to emphasize that our country's desire to clear the atmosphere in the world and to settle the conflicts -- even though it is obviously a highly difficult matter -- is a sincere desire. It is based on our deepest internal needs, because the main thing for us now is to raise living standards in the country and to carry out a radical restructuring of a whole series of aspects of life in our society. For this purpose we need a calm situation in the world. We need there to be no wars, especially wars near our borders.

Furthermore, it is no secret that the most extreme forces in the opposing camp -- and unfortunately they are largely calling the tune now -- are banking on economically exhausting the Soviet Union. The center of gravity is shifting toward the economic sphere, and, in addition to the arms race, they reckon to wear out the Soviet Union with regional conflicts and try to get it more and more bogged down in them. [passage omitted]

Our country is against the export of revolution, but we also categorically oppose the export of counterrevolution. That too is no far-fetched matter. We are now, unfortunately, witnessing a whole series of attempts to subvert legitimate governments and legitimately existing regimes. The Soviet Union is providing assistance; we do not hide our preferences: We are on the side of those who are struggling for their national and social emancipation, and, if necessary, that assistance may also be military.

The last thing I wish to say is that the restructuring taking place in our country has also clearly affected as important a part of foreign policy as our approach to regional conflicts. I think that our approach has become more realistic and, most important, more active. More active. We are not resigned to the fact that conflicts exist: We are not resigned to the fact that they may, as the phrase has it, become permanent fixtures. I repeat once more: The matter is a difficult one, but the country has no option other than to strive to see that they are brought to an end.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] A very interesting question has come from Muscovite Robert Izmaylovich Fayzulin. He gives the following formulation of his attitude toward events taking place in crisis areas: Does it not seem to you that we have made a mistake somewhere by allowing the United States to declare any location in the world a zone of its interests? Stanislav Nikolayevich, I will ask you to answer that question. You worked in the United States for a long time and know the U.S. Administration's approach to regional conflicts. [passage omitted]

[Kondrashov] [passage omitted] When describing U.S. behavior one must bear in mind that even the most warlike U.S. Conservatives prefer nonetheless to avoid the loss of American lives. [passage omitted]

Many Arab countries that are opening the gates of the Persian Gulf just a little -- opening the gates in response to U.S. solicitation, as it were -- nevertheless voice the anxiety: What happens if the U.S. naval forces for the Rapid Deployment Force are faced with a situation in which they are obliged to quickly withdraw, as it did with its Marines during the Lebanese crisis? [passage omitted] The USSR will only take action if the United States proceeds from words to deeds. After all, we do not have to send in one of our squadrons every time in response to a U.S. squadron. For instance, take the present situation in the Persian Gulf: There is a U.S. aircraft carrier in the area, as it were, alongside, the Constellation; the U.S. helicopter carrier Guadalcanal; the battleship Missouri is hurrying to the scene; and there are 15-20 other warships there. So what? Are we supposed (?to send in) one of our aircraft carriers, one of our helicopter carriers, some of our warships too?

[Seyful-Mulyukov] In other words, you mean that we do not view regional conflicts and crisis situations in the light of rivalry or confrontation..?

[Kondrashov, interrupting] That is right. We cannot imitate the imperialist behavior of the United States...

[Offscreen speaker, interrupting] But even so, it is necessary...

[Kondrashov, interrupting] Our policy cannot be a copy.

[Adamishin] But even so, our policy stops them at a certain point.

[Kondrashov] That is true. Our policy...

[Adamishin interrupting] It prevents them from crossing a certain line.

[Kondrashov] That is true. But I am saying that there does not necessarily have to be any direct military reaction, as, for instance, in the case of the Persian Gulf, the Persian Gulf situation that is now developing. We, in fact, favor a de-escalation rather than a continuing escalation. After all, if we take the political result or the military result of this latest U.S. adventurist move, we will see with what damage -- minimal or quite substantial -- they emerge.

As for the zones of influence, the spheres of influence, needless to say, behind all this is the policy -- let us give it its proper name, without beating around the bush -- of imperialism.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] The policy of neoglobalism, as we call it now.

[Kondrashov] Yes, the policy of neoglobalism, imperialism, and, of course, anti-Sovietism, because, if we take into account the fact that there are approximately 1,500 U.S. bases and other military installations and 500,000 servicemen scattered about the world, then, of course, the question is of encircling the Soviet Union. Alas, this policy is continuing, so to speak.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Judging by the questions coming in and seeing how busy our girls at the telephones are, it seems viewers are watching our program. Here are several questions on Afghanistan, fairly acute questions. Ivan Nikolayevich Zakharov from Moscow and Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Andreyev from Alma-Ata put their questions in the following way: Do you not think that we, our troops, are defending someone else's revolution in Afghanistan? Because, they write, every country and every revolution must be able to defend itself on its own. Pavel Yepifanovich, since you have been in Afghanistan and you know the situation there, I would like you to answer these questions.

[Demchenko] Yes, these are very serious questions. I think they are particularly disturbing for those of our people who have relatives or children now in Afghanistan. Indeed, the fact itself of our troops staying in another country under combat conditions is an extraordinary phenomenon. It is precisely because of this that we are showing an increased interest in the situation in Afghanistan and in events related to it. Regarding the core of these questions, it must be said that any revolution enjoys the right and opportunity of leaning upon international support. Think about the Paris Commune, or the Spanish events in the 1930's -- two more current examples. So, there is nothing surprising in the fact that the Afghan Government, in 1979 having found itself in a complex -- and I would even say, critical -- situation and having understood that it no longer had control over certain regions of the country and was unable to halt the continuous stream of weapons, gangs of saboteurs, printed materials, and so on, which was coming from across the border, began to turn to the Soviet Union for military aid. This was done on the basis of the treaty on friendship and cooperation that had been signed between our countries. There were several such requests during the summer and autumn of 1979. The decision to comply with them followed far from immediately. Why was this decision adopted anyway? First of all, it seems to me that at least two circumstances must be taken into consideration in this case: First, the fact that the fates of our two countries and two peoples were interwoven long ago, and mutual support has been carried out for decades.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] For nearly 70 years.

[Demchenko] Yes, and by that time...

[Offscreen voices, interrupting] Starting from 1919... for 68 years.

[Demchenko] Second, I think, one has to take into account a broader factor, i.e. the international situation at the end of the seventies.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] I beg your pardon, Pavel Yepifanovich. I just remembered a very interesting historical fact. Please, do not lose your train of thought, you will carry on with it. Speaking about the closeness and interrelation between the two neighboring states and about their traditional friendly policy, I remember that in the twenties, Afghan peasants helped to disarm gangs of bandits [basmach] which were being trained to be transferred to Soviet Central Asia. Another interesting fact: Afghan peasants sent grain to the starving in the Volga region, i.e. this is the feedback, so to speak, of the same internationalist support that you are talking about. I beg your pardon.

[Demchenko] Yes, I am returning to the second factor, i.e. to the international situation that was in evidence at the end of the seventies and that influenced the adopted decision and decisions, in general, which were being adopted then, nearly 8 years ago.

The thing is that detente was nearing the end, running out of breath, as it were. The situation in the world in general and in that region, in the region of south and southwest Asia was becoming complicated.

[Tsagolov] Especially, after the United States had lost its position in Iran.

[Demchenko] Yes, that was one of the facts, too. The undeclared war against Afghanistan, which, as we have already mentioned, highlighted a threat to our southern borders, maybe even the establishment of an enemy bridgehead there. Naturally, this ran counter to our national interests.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Also, the two incidents that took place this spring, such as the missile shelling of the Soviet border settlement of Pyandzh or the crossing of the River Pyandzh to the Soviet side of the border by a gang of dushmans who engaged in a battle with our border detachment and were repelled, naturally. These are also quite symbolic, albeit maybe insignificant, facts. [A map of Afghanistan is shown on a screen behind the panel]

[Demchenko] Yes, it confirms to a certain degree the idea I am putting forward. I would like to repeat that the decision to send a military contingent to Afghanistan was, of course, of an extraordinary nature. Currently, the situation in Afghanistan and around it is changing; perhaps, it is happening not as quickly as one would like it to, but a positive process is in progress step-by-step, and the question of withdrawing our troops from Afghanistan has been put on the agenda. As was announced, the schedule for this withdrawal has been agreed upon and a lot now depends, I think, on the talks that will be resumed in September in Geneva. In other words, the main idea is that Afghans must decide the fate of their country themselves. I repeat themselves. There are great obstacles in the way, however, and the main one, as I see it, is the fact that the undeclared war against Afghanistan is continuing, mainly from Pakistani territory.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] We now ask our television crew to show a short video tape about how this undeclared war is taking place, how it is being prepared, and what weapons are being handed to extremist groupings of dushmans. Run the tape, please. [passage omitted]

Let us get on with our conversation on Afghanistan. Questions have come from our viewers in which many ask about the policy of national reconciliation. The policy of national reconciliation, the invitation to representatives of the opposition to take part in a coalition government -- is it not a deviation from the position of the April Revolution in Afghanistan? This question was asked by Gleb Vasilyevich Lisashchev, a worker in the state agro-industrial complex. Other viewers are interested, in particular, in the PDPA's role in setting up an interparty system and coalition government. Please, Kim Makedonovich.

[Tsagolov] I will try to answer this question as I have been there from the very moment national reconciliation was announced, and I have seen it. [passage omitted] One must keep in mind that, long before the undeclared war, the U.S. CIA started preparing a plot against Afghanistan. As long ago as in the seventies -- in 1978 -- a wide intelligence network had already been prepared on Pakistan's territory. In 1973 - 1977 on Pakistani territory, 6,000 hit men were prepared. They were truly well-trained to conduct a hard and exhausting struggle.

That long period of war therefore brought enormous casualties to the Afghan people, and lot of suffering, tears, blood, and so on. But a revolutionary party -- and the PDPA is a revolutionary party -- cannot fail to ponder the fate of its people. The people want peace, so ths is the will of the people; I therefore think that the viewers and all of us here understand perfectly clearly that the step taken by the Afghan leadership and the promulgation of the strategy of national reconciliation is a step displaying great political courage and political realism.

The period of national reconciliation announced from the 15 January and now extended to 15 January 1988, escapes simple evaluations. One should not think that national reconciliation has brought nothing but success and that there is literally nothing but a cascade of successes by the Afghan Government and Afghan side, the revolutionary side. It is a difficult test both for the revolutionary authorities and even more so for the counterrevolution. Taken by itself, national reconciliation has established tough conditions for the counterrevolution, first and foremost because an alternative question has been asked: Either you care about the interests and will of the Afghan people and agree to a peaceful dialogue -- to an invitation to a peaceful dialogue -- or you do not agree, thus showing that your statements that you are defending the interests of the Afghan people is empty social demagogy.

Of course, this national reconciliation period has had a lot of successes and these should be publicized; one must learn about these successes. One must take into account that state authority is now functioning firmly in as many as 8,600 villages in 142 districts and in 68 subdistricts. State authority is functioning firmly in all provincial centers. Such provinces as Nimruz and Farah are turning into provinces of peace, on the whole. This is a success. The fact that 60,000 refugees have returned from abroad also should be regarded as a success. They have regained the felicity of being back in their native country. At the same time, an amnesty for political prisoners is being implemented and 6,000 persons have been amnestied; this has evoked a very positive response in the Afghan people. But, at the same time, a question can be often heard: What if it is a deviation? The question asked by the viewer contains this idea too. I do not think it is a deviation because the call for peaceful dialogue shows not the weakness of the revolution but its strength. The revolution has proved on the battlefield that it is defending its achievements and will be capable of defending them in the future too. The people are fully resolved to defend its achievements. It is a fact. The counterrevolution -- backed by imperialist circles led by the United States -- has failed so far, during this entire, long war, to achieve any successes. What we have now seen, an increasing flow, this also shows that imperialists' calculations are being proven wrong. Indeed, the United States does not give Stinger missiles to anyone else except Afghanistan, is that not so? This is a noteworthy fact, too. It does not give them to anyone else at all except but the Afghan rebels. This is how things are, you see.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] This is not entirely the case, Kim Makedonovich.

[Adamishin] (?I believe) that Saudi Arabia has them.

[Tasagolov] It is the case. It now wants to supply Saudi Arabia. You understand that prior to this, (?they were supplied) to no one.

[Seyful-Mulyukov, interrupting] No, Stingers hae been in the hands of the Saudi Armed Forces for a long time.

[Tsagolov] Prior to this they did not have them.

[Adamishin] In Angola, too.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] [Words indistinct] In Angola, too, yes.

[Tsagolov] In combat actions, and all the more so it has been supplied there for the first time. After all it is not because they are having an easy time of it, because nothing is succeeding for them. This is an expensive and complicated weapon. Nevertheless, it is being supplied. So, it is not because they are having an easy time of it. This is the first factor.

The second factor I would like to note is, of course, that national reconciliation is a comlicated process. A certain polarization is taking place within the Party, too. Some people thought this would be very fast. They counted on a fast success. This is, of course, a complicated process. Polarization is taking place also within the counterrevolution; therefore, in this respect, national reconciliation is of very great political importance. I think that step by step the positions in national reconciliation, the positions of the revolution, the positions of the PDPA will grow stronger. That is what I think.

[Demchenko] Kim Makedonovich, I would like to add one thought to what you said. You mentioned the word realism. I would like to develop one idea here. The fact of the matter is that realism was required both from the PDPA leadership and from, so to speak, the DRA Government leadership. I had occasion to observe the development of this republic at various stages, beginning from 1979. I visited Afghanistan more than once. Unfortunately, I must admit that in Afghanistan there was too much rushing ahead on a political level. Socialist slogans and a program for building socialism were proclaimed at the first stage of the Afghan Revolution. You remember?

[Tsagolov] Yes.

[Demchenko] The revolution is divided into two stages.

[Tsagolov] The so-called idea of people's revolution?

[Demchenko] Yes, yes.

[Tsagolov] Yes.

[Demchenko] This was rushing ahead in an unprepared country, essentially semiliterate, where 90 to 92 percent of the people are illiterate, where the greater part of the population -- expressing myself with Lenin's words -- is altogether outside politics. Suddenly, socialist slogans were proclaimed there which, on the whole, had no firm foundation. I could even cite such an example as the program for the elimination of illiteracy. [passage omitted]

[Tsagolov] Now revolutionary theory really has gotten through.

[Demchenko] Of course. But, in the period prior to the proclamation of the national reconciliation program, the situation was already becoming more realistic.

The slogan: The Building of Socialism was withdrawn, and as you know, was withdrawn correctly. I even expressed the thought that it was withdrawn somewhat late. It had outlived its usefulness.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] I also remember this. [passage omitted]

[Demchenko] I would like to state more precisely that the problem is one of realism. It broadens the support base for the regime, for the creation of a new coalition regime. After all, the point is that it is necessary to create a coalition regime on a broad political platform and not to impose it, even on the opposition forces or some groupings.

[Tsagolov] To invite (?then)?

[Demchenko] But to enter into a honest compromise.

[Adamishin] I would put it even more definitely, to share power...

[Tsagolov, interrupting] Yes!

[Adamishin] To share power...

[Tsagolov, interrupting] To allow the Afghan leadership to express itself.

[Adamashin] And share power in earnest. Not some posts on the fringe, but the posts, say, of vice president, of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. This is already being announced openly in Afghanistan. So, a course has been taken seriously here indeed towards achieving, at last, a broad [word indistinct]...

[Demchenko, interrupting] A nationwide platform.

[Adamashin] A nationwide platform.

[Tsagolov] It was even said that there can be a dialogue even on the question of the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers.

[Demchenko] Quite right!

[Tsagolov] Then it was said that 23 ministerial posts can be handed over, that is to say, what revolutionary rule can now offer to the opposition forces. This is great realism, indeed. To this I would like to add the following: Sometimes our TV viewers get the impression that these steps are, as it were, a retreat of the revolution. This is not a retreat, but, on the contrary...

[Adamishin, interruption] A strengthening.

[Tsagolov] A strengthening of the revolution.

[Demchenko] Yes, a strengthening of the revolution.

[Tsagolov] That is to say, what we get is that the revolution takes up a position which is in accordance with the level of social development.

[Adamishin] Yes.

[Tsagolov] Do you understand?

[Adamishin] Yes.

[Tsagolov] This is not [word indistinct] but the language of realism you are speaking of.

[Adamishin] (?This is because) it is a social-democratic revolution.

[Demchenko] I would like to stress...

[Adamishin, interrupting] Social-democratic revolution.

[Tsagolov] Yes!

[Adamishin] This is its stage, hence also corresponding slogans.

[Tsagolov] Yes.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Very many questions are coming in on Afghanistan, and not only on problems connected with national reconciliation, the setting up of a coalition government, and the discussion of the draft of the new constitution, but also questions connected with the fate of Soviet people, both in military uniform and in civilian dress, in Afghanistan. Here are quite a few questions. In particular, Nikolay Ivanovich Petrov, a Muscovite; Andrey Vladimirovich Novikov; Sergey Ivanovich Doshchenko, a bus driver from Zelentsov; and others ask about our losses in Afghanistan. Kim Makedonovich, I think that (?you should) answer this question.

[Tsagolov] Of course. This question is not an easy one. At the same time, Soviet people's anxiety over this problem is understandable. I think that one could say the following on this question: Saying that we have no losses there would be simply insane because there is no war without losses, there is no war without people dying. We, too, have losses there. This is indisputable. Our soldiers, fulfilling their internationalist duty, are displaying courage and heroism, and, of course, not infrequently, are also perishing. This is understandable. In our country on the whole, we do not publish such data. For this reason, I would like the television viewers asking this question to look at it from a slightly different angle. Would it not be better and has the time not come, Farid Mustafyevich, to speak aloud about the domestic soldiers who perished there, to say what they did, to say how they waged war, to say how they perished heroically? One can even make a link here with combat traditions. After all, there are many exploits there which are in keeping with the exploits from the times of the Patriotic War. This must also be understood. Very often the question is also asked: Why on cemeteries -- say, an internationalist soldier has died -- shouldn't it be written that he perished there and exactly what he accomplished. I think it would make sense. Why shouldn't one make fraternal graves and somehow indicate these soldiers. In this respect I think that this is a correct question and PRAVDA recently carried a good article entitled: I Would Not Send You to Afghanistan. I think that...

[Seyful-Mulyukov, interrupting] This is the declaration of a bureaucrat [words indistinct].

[Tsagolov] Of a bureaucrat, yes. If we covered these questions more honestly and openly, including in the press, one would not need to be afraid of these questions. That way there would be fewer such bureaucrats in our country, and they would not pronounce such a blasphemous phrase. They would know precisely that their homeland sent them there and that they are discharging their duty there with honor and dignity.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] I would like to say a few words in connection with this. I repeatedly visited Afghanistan, and the last time I was there was during the withdrawal of our six regiments. We journalists -- and this applies to me too -- have sinned against the truth in our reporting on the work of the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. Remember the moving reports? Our soldiers are building playgrounds for Afghan children, are performing voluntary unpaid work on their days off, are giving concerts for local inhabitants. All this has happened and is still happening. As you know, Army life is multifaceted, but behind the footage there often remained and remain the military feats of our internationalist soldiers. After all, they are constantly risking their lives, are tried on the crucible of Afghanistan, rescuing thousands of Afghan children, women and children, helping these friendly people to defend their freedom and independence. I remember our fearless pilots. I saw them at work when they brought their aircraft in to land in areas where ground-to-air missiles were being used by the dushmans. I remember our sappers using their courage and skill against mines, and finally our soldiers who travel in open armed carriers along Afghanistan's perfidious mountain roads, ready to accept battle at any second and to discharge their internationalist duty.

[Tsagolov] They also deliver food and goods to the villages.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] The attitude of very, very many Afghans toward this -- we saw that at the time of the withdrawal of the six regiments -- is unequivocal gratitude. [passage omitted]

A whole range of questions has come in on the one theme: When will our troops be withdrawn from Afghanistan? I ask you to answer these questions.

[Adamishin] I do not think it is fortuitous that we are talking about Afghanistan such a great deal. For us, for Soviet people, for our country, this is the main question of all conflicts existing in the world. It is the sorest subject. And, not fortuitously, at the 27th congress, Afghanistan was called a bleeding wound. I agree with you that there is no need for us to shamefully hide the casualities we are forced to take there in order for them to remain nameless. I said at first that in this area our policy is also undergoing changes, is also becoming more realistic and more active. This also applies in full to this the past 2 years -- in order that a political settlement be reached, in order that national reconciliation be achieved, in order that our troops be at least able to leave Afghanistan -- more has been done than during all the other years that have elapsed since the start of the war. Serious work is being conducted to bring forward the date for the return of our people, our soldiers. We are rejecting stereotypes, not taking anything for granted, not taking as given things which, as you quite rightly say, mean getting ahead of ourselves.

[Adamishin] I also agree with you, in that the national reconciliation process is facing difficulties. The policy is undoubtedly a bold one, a policy which does not meet with everybody's understanding in Afghanistan; this certainly has to be said, because it is a sharp change. What about the sharp changes in our history? Did they meet with full understanding from all? The Brest peace, for example? But they are working on it, quite definitely. I think this must be said, in order to try to answer the specific question, When will the withdrawal of our troops be implemented? First of all, I would say this: The question of the withdrawal of the troops has, in principle, been resolved. The Soviet Union is in favor of it being on a compressed timescale. But, of course, taking the realities in Afghanistan into account, because we cannot, as they say, leave the situation there to fate, we cannot allow, for example, a bloodbath to begin in Afghanistan following withdrawal of our troops. At the Afghan-Pakistani talks that you spoke of, the Pakistani side is insisting on a 7-month timetable for withdrawal, following the achievement of a settlement, that is. The Pakistanis, from whose territory interference is coming -- and by the way it is not coming only from Pakistani territory -- also understand that some period has to elapse. So, a compressed timetable for withdrawal of the troops, giving the Afghans the chance to decide their affairs completely independently. For us, the main thing is for Afghanistan to be an independent country, nonaligned, and friendly toward the Soviet Union. That is how I would answer the question. And, if I say, today, as you all know, comrades, is an anniversary.

[Seyful-Mulyukov, interrupting] Sixty-eight years since restoration of independence.

[Adamishin] I think it is worth giving a reminder about this. Today greetings telegrams are published, and our position is quite clearly outlined in them too, so I think that we can greet our Afghan friends on this glorious date.

[Tsagolov] On the withdrawal of troops, I would like to add that Comrade Najib has said very simply, precisely, and concisely, that a timetable has been agreed upon between the Afghan and Soviet sides. Now the question is not up to us, but up to the imperialist circles, because a problem that has been holding up the withdrawal has been clearly defined: That is ending external interference and giving the Afghan people the chance to resolve their problems independently, guaranteeing noninterference, and not continuing the war.

[Kondrashov] Unfortunately, they are not likely to help us.

[Demchenko] The United States will have an interest in us being kept there longer.

[Adamishin] Quite right, it has to be stopped, and the nonresumption of interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs has to be guaranteed. But, speaking frankly, I do not always like the phrase: Now it is up to the imperialist forces, as if we were passing the initiative to them. No, the matter concerns, first and foremost, energetic work on our part, energetic work by our Afghan friends, our own energetic work. Certainly we should not count on them to give us any gifts, or to fail to make use of a situation which is most opportune for imperialism right to the end. So in this, we have to count on our own forces and on difficult work every single day, which, let me repeat, is already being conducted. [passage omitted]

[Seyful-Mulyukov] I think we will now return, or rather turn our gaze to another crisis, other hotspots, in the Persian Gulf. Here is an interesting question from viewers, servicemen, and others. They ask: How do you explain the zig-zag of the U.S. Administration one minute toward Iraq, another toward Iran, in connection with the events occurring there over the past 6 months? Stanislav Nikolayevich, please take this question.

[Kondrashov] I do not think the description zig-zag quite conveys the state of affairs. The Americans would of course like to preserve, or not lose, or somehow strengthen their influence in the region, and for them it would in essence be desirable to have both Iran and Iraq to depend on. After all, prior to the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iran was a very important strategic bridgehead for the United States, directed against the Soviet Union. As you know, the Islamic Revolution was a heavy blow to U.S. calculations in this context, and their influence plummeted to virtually zero. What is more, the development of the Islamic Revolution, if you take 1980, and the fact that U.S. hostages were taken and detained there for 444 days, has played its sorry part in the fate of President Carter, and it was one of the reasons why he was not reelected and Reagan was elected.

The political situation and the U.S. influence in Iran have changed, but the strategic position of Iran, form their point of view, has remained as before, and remains important. That is why there is such a situation whereby the United States, as it were, is overtly opposed to the present Iranian regime, but undertook this attempt at secret deals for arms supplies to Iran in order to gain a hand in the internal struggle that the United States thought was going on, and in order to strengthen the forces which, it thought, might be potentially pro-American -- despite the counterweight Ayatollah Khomeyni -- and in general for the day when the ayatollah, with his immense [word indistinct] influence, will leave the political scene. So the attempt was made, the zig-zag, if you like, although a secret one, in the direction of Iran. You know what came of this and how it all ended sadly for the United States, that is, such a state of confrontation with Iran did not exist before.

As far as Iraq is concerned, then of course there is a question here for the United States of its influence more broadly in the Arab world, in particular, in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and in other Arab countries which the United States thinks are more or less inclined toward it, or moderate, and which in their turn are Iraq's allies. So it seems to me that U.S. prestige is very low in the region at the moment, but the game that is going on is something like that.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] There are a whole series of questions directly concerning the Iran-Iraq conflict. Here is one of the questions, posed by (Sergey Filipov), a student from Moscow. The Iranian leadership has demanded, as one of the conditions for a cease-fire, that the Security Council pass a resolution in which Iraq is condemned as the instigator of this conflict. So the viewer asks: Who is right and who is wrong? Pavel Yepifanovich, you were PRAVDA correspondent in Iraq and you were in Iran before that. I think you can answer this question.

[Demchenko] I foresaw that this question would obviously come up, because the Iran-Iraq conflict....

[Seyful-Mulyukov, interrupting] It is a usual question, incidentally.

[Demchenko] Yes. The Iran-Iraq conflict, in its bloodiness and protracted nature is, all in all, one of the most prolonged since the World War II. I picked up two books which I would like to show now, if the cameraman will help me out, to our viewers. [video shows Demchenko showing two books, one Iraqi, the other Iranian with some English titles reading "Mirro of War"]. This book, published by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tells about the prehistory, the start and the first stages of the war between Iran and Iraq. This other book -- here it is -- was published in Tehran and tells the Iranian version of the emergence of the conflict and the first stages. There are many illustrations and many documents in both books, and I have to say that the stances outlined here are diametrically opposed, diametrically opposed. So, well, the Iraqi book, as you can see, is even more massive, they have taken a longer period from the point of view of documentation. Each of the sides puts the blame on the other. So, displaying, so to speak, the maximum objectivity and respect for the stances of these two sides, I can say, you know, that the conflict between Iran and Iraq is an old one. It is made up mainly -- I will summarize, leaving to one side the juridical aspect of the question, three aspects:

First, is the disputed territory -- that is, a border conflict.

Second, is the problem of navigation on the Shatt al-Arab River, that is, the southern part of the border between Iraq and Iran goes along the river, where the Tigris and Euphrates converge forming a wide river, and where the border should be. According to the Iraqi version it should pass along the Iranian bank, in the Iranian version it should pass along the thalweg, that is, through the middle of the channel, so that there should be freedom of navigation to both sides.

Finally, the third problem is the Kurdish question, that is, concerning the northern part of Iraq. The fact is that the Kurds, split by imperialism among various countries, live on the territories of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and so forth. Well, in this case we are concerned with the first two countries. [passage omitted]

In 1975 an agreement was reached in Algeria between Iraq and Iran, but following the revolutionary changes and changes in the governments, the conflict once again erupted. Iraq asserts that in August 1980, in reality, a pure war situation had arisen on the border. Iraq thus had the right to some kind of retaliatory action. In the Iranian version it says, giving a perfectly specific date, that on 22 September, Iraq crossed the Iranian border and undertook the initiative of a major military attack. That is how they describe the onset of the war. [passage omitted] I would like to say that we are now at the stage where, as they say, a ray of light can be seen at the end of the tunnel, some kind of star has started to shine, some kind of prospect has been sighted, some kind of approach. The deputy foreign minister could perhaps put it more precisely. We journalists put things more sweepingly, so to speak.

[Adamishin] (?That is a good thing).

[Demchenko] Yes. Approaches, then. Recently the Security Council, as you know, passed a resolution. This resolution calls for both sides to cease fire and start talks. Iraq approved this resolution, that is, accepted it. Iran responded, I would say, evasively, that is, not saying yes or no. This very fact -- because Iran has responded to the many previous resolutions with a categorical no -- now arouses some kind of hope, all the more so since, as I understand, the UN secretary general will soon be going to Tehran; the foreign press is now writing about this. It is also a factor for peace and not an act of war, because the United Nations is meant to settle conflicts and to involve itself in settlements. But I would like to say in this connection, summing up, as it were, what I have outlined, that this is what the

position should be: Resolving disputed issues at the negotiating table; halting fire; and stopping the bloodletting, the very brutal bloodletting.

Until now, that is, up to the time of the Security Council resolution -- and this needs to noted because all the great powers were for the first time unanimous in accepting it -- there was some wavering. It was most difficult to elaborate resolutions of this kind of decisiveness -- Iran up until now was insisting, basically, upon three conditions: The first is recognition of Iraq as the aggressor; the second compensation for the damage inflicted; and the third is a change in the regime in Iraq, that is, in effect, interference in the internal affairs, in the competence of the Iraqi people themselves. Now, a new approach has appeared in outline. [passage omitted]

[Kondrashov] May I just say a couple of words? Pavel Yepifanovich, of course, concluded his reply to this question on an optimistic note, perhaps too optimistic. He says that a light has started to shine at the end of the tunnel, but at the same time the contradictory nature of the present situation is also shining, but it is not light that has started to shine and stands more clearly before us but in fact the specter or the nightmare of the conflict growing. It is not so much the Iran-Iraq conflict as, so to speak, the possibility of an international conflict coming out of the bounds of the Iran-Iraq conflict hence the factor everyone knows, which we follow so intently from day to day, hour by hour, the concentration of the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf.

[Demchenko] Unfortunately, that is true, yes.

[Tsagolov] Not only the United States but also the UK is involved now...

[Kondrashov, interrupting] Yes, yes, the UK is on its way there, and France and the more it grows, the more it acquires a kind of inertia that, perhaps, will be more difficult to halt. The mightier the concentration, the more explosive material and, probably, the possibility of some kind of spark and, probably, of it really growing into a broader conflict.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Anatoliy Leonidovich, here are a number of questions from viewers concerning our approach to the settlement of the Persian Gulf crisis, the possibility of cooperation between Moscow and Washington in the process of settling the Iran-Iraq conflict and reducing tension in this region, a request to outline our stance on these matters, asked by very many viewers, I cannot list them all.

[Adamishin] I will try to be very brief, taking into account the fact that many aspects have already been covered here. First, our policy in this region is an honest one and an open [otkrytaya] one. From the very start of the war we have advocated it being stopped. From the very outset we described it as senseless, as a bloody slaughter that must be stopped. From time to time we have been accused of this being, as they say, a two-faced policy and that in fact, we have, for some reason or another, maybe from the Afghan or some other standpoint, an interest in the continuation of the conflict. Nothing of the sort. We are in word and in deed promoting the halting of the war. Moreover, I should say that, objectively speaking, the possibility of having an influence so that the war can be stopped is not very great, not very great. That is the objective reality.

Well, fighting, as they say, for the war to be stopped is, as it happens, the road that the United States wants to follow, so to speak, to push things to the boiling point. Therefore, those opportunities that present themselves must be used in a carefully weighted-up manner, very carefully.

Our policy, I think, will be no sin, as they say, it is a carefully weighted policy, an honest and considered policy. We consider the continuation of this war a challenge to the world community. We have been among the most active participants in the elaboration of the kind of resolution that, as you said absolutely correctly, for the first time talks in insistent tones about stopping the war, about withdrawal to internationally recognized borders. This resolution was voted for unanimously in the UN Security Council, and this means that all five great powers voted for this resolution. This is an oblique reply to your question concerning the possibility of cooperation, including with the United States, on stopping the war. I would like to say however, that the United States is conducting a fairly insidious policy, fairly insidious.

[Tsagolov] Although the United States voted for it.

[Adamishin, interrupting] Not so much...

[Konopashov, interrupting] The United States voted with one hand and with the other sent...

[Adamishin interrupts] One gets the impression not so much that it wants to stop the war as much as to do some kind of harm to us in this region, and on the other hand strengthen their own military presence. I recall that last year I was talking to the Americans about regional problems, and they pressed me fairly insistently, saying: Your allies supply arms to Iran; this must be stopped; We, the Americans, and our West European allies, have done the work, and these arms are coming from, I don't know, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia or the DPRK, and so on. You must do this work with them. I did not know at that time about Irangate, but I said to them: Don't look this way for the origins of the arms. Then it turned out, just imagine, that at the very time of the talks about the need for joint actions in the Security Council, about the need to stop the supplies, that at the same time -- under the table, as they say -- Americans were doing things that the government did not know all about. There was some kind of shadow cabinet operating, which was acting, so to speak, on behalf of the great power.

All in all these are things that are, so to speak, hardly conceivable. So here too there is a need, simultaneously, to counter the threats being made by the U.S. military presence, the U.S. maneuvers. It means that it has not succeeded in setting up, as they say, relations with Iran. We are now getting a kind of list, so to speak, from the other side [as heard] but the goals being pursued in this respect are the same: To strengthen their own presence and to try, as they say, to impede us there.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Incidentally, in the past week the U.S. press has been throwing up reports that the dialogue between Washington and Tehran continues, despite the tension, despite the presence of the armada of U.S. vessels in the Persian Gulf. Recently there was a report -- I think in the Swiss newspaper SUISSE -- of a meeting held there in two hotels between Ahmed Khomeyni, the son of Ayatollah Khomeyni, and the secretary of a very influential politician, the speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Rafsanjani, and U.S. and Israeli officials. Or take the recent press conference by Shultz, where he said: We have the opportunity to continue this dialogue via Switzerland and through Algeria; when we need to convey some message or another we do so.

[Adamishin] You are right. The Americans have a policy on many levels here. This is, in a manner of speaking, an apple pie.

We, in our turn, need, as they say, to be more crafty, and clever in order to be able to steer our ship through the stormy waters of the Persian Gulf. What I want to stress, however, is that the Soviet Union voted for the resolution and advocates its implementation. We favor the UN secretary general working on this, in accordance with the resolution, and, of course, it is a positive factor that Tehran, for the first time in all these years, has given a response, albeit a contradictory one, that is not purely negative. It seems to me that it would be worth having a look at what opportunities are concealed there. It is not worth closing the door to this. I would like to stress once again that, in line with this kind of policy, we are being made to quarrel both with Iran and with Iraq.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] There are very many questions from viewers, specifically Comrade (Aruturov) from Moscow, and others, asking about our relations with Iran. I will ask you to tell us briefly about this interesting and important question.

[Adamishin] Fine. I'll just summarize the previous idea, that we are now in contact with both sides. You know that Yuliy Mikhaylovich Vorontsov, first deputy foreign affairs minister has traveled to the Persian Gulf and Near East countries. So we are carrying out there, so to speak, an honest mission in order that the war be stopped, even though the imperialist interference there has increased. Incidentally, we have spoken out for the withdrawal of the fleets, including our own. People say to us: What about clearing mines. That is, in truth, a serious problem. The mining of international waters is a most grave violation of international law that the international community must not, generally speaking, overlook. We say that this problem too can be resolved jointly, but not so that the way is cleared of mines for a naval armada.

As far as our relations with Iran are concerned, you know that in recent years they have gone through their ups and downs. We have displayed very great restraint, proceeding from the fact that whatever might happen, the 50 million Iranians are a nation, our neighbors, with whom we have a long border. This has not stopped us from taking a principled stance for the cessation of the war, but I think that we can now speak of a certain revival in our relations. This concerns both political contacts and economic ties, and one could boldly say that this is to the detriment of no one, but could facilitate not only our bilateral relations but also an improvement in the overall situation.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Incidentally, a number of viewers are drawing attention to the fact that dushman bands are continuing to be sent from Iranian territory to Afghan territory. The other day a populated area near Herat was shelled by Iranian weapons, and the Afghan Foreign Ministry made a...

[Unidentified speaker, interrupting] A representation.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Yes, a representation. Anyway, a number of questions concern Afghanistan. Perhaps the most significant of these, so to speak, are questions connected with the request to characterize the main dushman groupings. Who is the specific opponent of the policy of national reconciliation? Kim Makedonovich...

[Adamishin, interrupting] Excuse me, but I would just like to add a couple of words regarding this aspect of Iranian activity. We are not closing our eyes to it, and Iran...

[Unidentified speaker interrupting] Iran and Afghanistan, you mean?

[Adamishin] Yes, that's right, and the fact that... [changes thought] It is indeed on a considerably smaller scale than from Pakistani territory, but interference is also coming from that side, and we are telling the Iranians, what one would call impartially, that we do not feel that just because it is our neighbor we will close our eyes to those things that we don't like about its policy.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Quite. Let's continue our conversation about Afghanistan. Kim Makedonovich, please.

[Tsagolov] Well, in order to answer this question as to who are the opponents of national reconciliation...

[Seyful-Mulyukov, interrupting] Specifically.

[Tsagolov] Specifically, yes.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Which groupings.

[Tsagolov] Which groupings. I would perhaps take it from the opposite end, and that is with whom is the Afghan leadership planning and considering it possible to have a dialogue. Then let's get on to this question. I would first of all like to make the point that the Afghan leadership considers such talks, such a dialogue, on reconciliation and seeking joint ways, including setting up a coalition government, possibly with supporters of the former King Mohammad Zahir Shah, an alliance of the three political parties. That means parties headed by (?Abdol Mujadi) and (?Gelani Nabi) that alliance...

[Seyful-Mulyukov, interrupting] Which comprises the (?alliance)...

[Tsagolov] Which comprises the (?alliance of seven) in Pakistan, but it occupies there a somewhat particular...

[Seyful-Mulyukov, interrupting] A more moderate position?

[Tsagolov] A more moderate position, yes. Perhaps talks with various kinds of moderate public and political figures of previous regimes, leaders of revolutionary groups of the middle line in Afghanistan itself -- tribal leaders, or democratic organizations which also exist in Afghanistan, perhaps those, too, and with the clergy, with private entrepreneurs, trades people, and so on. In this event the question usually arises that the Afghan side does not exclude the question of creating new parties. That is also, incidentally, a very flexible position of the Afghan leadership.

Indeed, one point about national reconciliation is the thesis that open activity by opposition parties is possible, including the creation of new parties. Well, let's say we talk about the perfectly possible creation of a party by the Afghan clergy. That's one thing. Or maybe a peasant's party. Nor can one rule out the emergence of a party of the liberal bourgeoisie, that's also possible. So there you have the outline of a circle of social forces with whom it is possible to have a dialogue. Now comes the question: Who is against it? And here, first and foremost, one must, of course, have in mind the extremist section of the counterrevolution, and, above all, such organizations which are headed by Hekmatyar Golbaddin. Rabani, Khales...

[Seyful-Mulyukov, interrupting] Khales?

[Tsagolov] Khales, yes. This is a really very extremist section. They make no compromises. Even talks with their partners in the seven, here there is, as it were, a division of power. Nobody wants to share power with Hekmatyar Golbaddin. That is incidentally, precisely why, Khales' party broke away from Golbaddin's party. Precisely these differences...

[Seyful-Mulyukov] There are hundreds of differences between them...

[Tsagolov, interrupting] Hundreds of differences, yes. Recently, on 18 July, in a telephone interview the BBC spoke to (Khukhatula Mujadidi) and when the question was asked as to whether there were any differences, he replied: hundreds of these differences. Therefore, that is also one of the positive elements of national reconciliation, the fact that it is leading to a polarization of the forces of counterrevolution. So, one must bear this in mind, this extremist section of the counterrevolution. They have commanded their armed formations in Afghanistan itself, inside the country, they have given the command to attack relentlessly. One needs to point out that in the period of national reconciliation, although the Afghan leadership declared a unilateral ceasefire and urged the opposing side to this, at the same time they stated: If the enemy undertakes combat operations then we will retaliate.

[Adamishin] But, surely, if they wish to overthrow the authorities by means of arms...

[Tsagolov, interrupting] Yes?

[Adamishin] They would, as before, set the following task: What would be the (?answer to those) who do not go...

[Tsagolov, interrupting] Quite so. Then what we have is...[changes thought] Just think of the insidiousness of it. The rebels from the villages often fire on our garrisons there, in order to provoke a retaliatory strike on the village, a retaliatory strike on a populated area. Our people are very restrained on these questions. You know how it is? But one must add here that it is precisely the extremist section of the counterrevolution and the forces of international reaction who are behind them who have recently sharply increased the transfer of weapons there, on the caravan routes. Old destroyed bases are being rebuilt there, new bases are being created; in other words to put it crudely, we have an escalation of the war. We cannot accept forces who do not accept national reconciliation. They are amassing energy and strength to carry out widescale operations.

[Demchenko] Just a sentence or two if you will allow me...

[Seyful-Mulyukov, interrupting] Yes, of course.

[Demchenko] I would like, having listened to what you have been saying, to add that despite the bitterness which Kim Makedonovich was talking about just now, still this realistic political platform has provided an opportunity to split the opposition, and it has brought to light those wings, those forces -- we call them groupings -- with whom it is possible to have a dialogue and even to include in government. I say again, this process is a slow one, because evolution is not always easy.

[Tsapolov] Restructuring...

[Demchenko, interrupting] They are located there in Pakistan in an enemy camp, these heads. But, still, the possibilities -- I would like to emphasize this point, together with the intensification of combat operations in some provinces -- the possibilities for a political dialogue have obviously now increased.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Well, now let us turn to other hot spots. Pavel Yepifanovich, a whole series of questions here on the situation in the Near East. Viewer Safronov asks: Is an international conference on the Near East being proposed? Could the USSR and Israel participate in it if there are still no diplomatic relations between them? I would like you to answer this question briefly.

[Demchenko] Yes, very briefly. An international conference with the participation of all the interested sides was at one time proposed by the Soviet Union. That was quite some time ago. Since then, one might say that a certain historic experience, not only experience, but a certain history has built up on the development of this issue. The position is such now that if we refer to the Arab camp, then here there is virtually a unanimous desire to take part in such a conference. There are certain complications, but a unanimous desire. Syria, first and foremost -- a country which up to now has been occupied; the Golan Heights, that is just over a 1,000 km which is in the frontline of the struggle -- it is ready tomorrow, so to speak, to send its delegation to take part in this conference. And Jordan, and Egypt; Lebanon -- the Lebanese Government -- also states that it will also take part in the conference if invited. Well, as you recall, the participation of the great powers is also envisaged in this conference. A clarification of our proposal has led to a situation whereby all the permanent members of the Security Council could participate there. Here we come up against certain difficulties.

One of the participants -- direct participants -- of the Middle East conflict, Israel, speaks against the conference. If one was to split hairs in this respect it would appear that even the Israeli (?press) is not entirely against the conference. For instance, foreign minister...

[Seyful-Mulyukov, interrupting] Shim'on Peres.

[Demchenko] Right. Shim'on Peres is an advocate of such a conference, although he has hiw own view of that conference. But, the prime minister, who represents Likud, the rightist bloc, is categorically against the conference. Israel enjoys the whole-hearted support of the United States of America. Whereas Britain is reserved and France is in favor, the United States -- I am speaking of the Western camp -- the United States along with Israel practically impedes holding this conference, and the effort is thereby frustrated. But as I said, there are nuances in Israel. An Israeli journalist visited here recently and said that an enormous struggle is underway in society over participation in this conference. Some groupings have even embarked on meetings with the PLO, with its leaders, to foster contacts and express their nonacceptance of the extremist stance in Israel.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] All is clear, thank you. Let us take...

[Adamishin, interrupting] Can I add a few words?

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Certainly.

[Adamishin] First, the very fact that the words international conference are again figured should be attributed to the USSR's effort, and that also reflects our new approach to international affairs. We did not think it possible to say: Let the conflict perpetuate itself; nothing can be done about it -- although it is very difficult indeed to do anything -- and we undertook active efforts in order to stir things up there. I believe we did it precisely at the moment when the mood favoring a political settlement arose. This was because they got tired: The Arabs and Israel got tired of the confrontation, which they felt was a dead end, and some decision had to be found.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] For 40 years, incidentally.

[Demchenko] The longest regional conflict.

[Adamishin] That was the first thing I wanted to stress. The second thing I want to stress is that our active policy here involves all potential participants in that conference, including Israel. We do not approve of Israel's expansionist policies. The Soviet Union has never been against the existence of Israel as a state, but has been against the latter's expansionist policies. The reestablishment of our diplomatic relations with Israel is linked to the situation in the Middle East...

[Seyful-Mulyukov, interrupting] With the settlement...

[Adamishin, interrupting] With the relinquishment of such policies. You were absolutely right to say that there is now a struggle in Israel over participation in the conference. This struggle is being waged by those who still want to rely upon force and to keep what they have seized by force -- some go even further saying that there are still Arabs who should all be deported -- extremist elements. But there are also people who think soberly and who feel that in the long run it can spell trouble for Israel itself. Unfortunately, in my view, for the moment the tone is being set by the former of the two forces.

There are some indications the Soviet Union does not want to pass by. We maintain contacts with Israel from time to time on the issues of the Middle East settlement, and a few days ago a working meeting took place in Bonn between officials of the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry and the Israeli one in an effort to detect some common viewpoints. Of course, the divergence is great, but I want to emphasize the fact that the Soviet Union works actively in this area as well with all those who can constitute a useful basis for that conference.

[Tsaganov] The search for a path is in progress.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] A number of viewers ask us to shed light on the situation in Central America, particularly Viktor Vasilyevich Karpukhin, Vladimir Yakovlevich Lukin, and Nikolay Aleksandrovich Khomutov of Tambov ask: What was Washington's reaction to the agreement of the five Central American states on normalizing the crisis situation in that area? Is there any hope that the United States will cease its intervention against Nicaragua, will discontinue its material help to the contras? Stanislav Nikolayevich, I ask you to answer these questions.

[Kondrashov] Well, what was Washington's reaction? As you know, Washington attempted to deal a preemptive blow to this Guatemalan plan, that is, to the plan for political settlement in Central America proposed by the five Central American presidents. The United States put forward its own plan, but that plan was not taken into account by the participants of the Guatemalan plan, the five presidents of the Central American states. It was that Guatemalan plan which offered some kind of hope for a political settlement that found its way on to the agenda, after all. That plan was also signed, as you know, by Nicaraguan President Ortega.

What is the attitude of the United States? Well, the United States, the Reagan administration, have never made any bones about their intention to topple the present Nicaraguan, Sandinist regime. That intent, although slightly masked by the latest plan which is known as the Reagan and Wright plan, that is, the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, is still in force, that strategy is still in force. They want to preserve armed aid to the contras. They want to turn the tables on the matter so that the U.S. Congress votes again in favor of that aid, although they do not have much hope. They want to bury that Guatemalan plan.

Here is, for instance, a rather interesting pronouncement by White House Spokesman Fitzwater, who in an attempt to embrace these two elements which are not quite compatible -- quite incomptible -- said that our position is that plans are operational depending on how they fit into a jigsaw puzzle. Well, about the puzzle, Thomas Foley, another and rather authoritative U.S. spokesman, leader of the Democratic opposition in the House of Representatives, has described what that puzzle really looks like: When the United States on the one hand declares its support for the peaceful process, and on the other embarks again on arming the contras, the fault for any frustration of the peaceful process will rest with us.

It is still to be seen what turn events will take. Ministers of the five Central American countries are still meeting with each other on the 19th and 20th, and the United States is holding and has already held a conference of its ambassadors to the five Central American countries, and is trying to influence this meeting of Central American ministers toward, as they put it, improving the Guatemalan plan, that is, such an improvement that could be acceptable for the United States. [passage omitted]

[Seyful-Mulyukov] About 15 minutes are left before the end of our program. I remember you have some questions connected with a settlement of the Cambodian problem.

[Kondrashov] Yes, there is a question from Ilya Ivanovich Kalturin, a retired colonel. He says that among issues, there is the solution of the Cambodian problem. What is the role of the Soviet Union in a solution to this problem? Well, I shall give a very brief answer, especially as the Cambodian problem has receded at least into a secondary position in comparison with such tense situations as the Persian Gulf or Nicaragua. But there is some movement there. There is nevertheless some movement toward national reconciliation. This course is now being pursued by the Cambodian Government, which is ready to hold negotiations -- and corresponding ideas have been expressed -- with the other side and in particular with Sihanouk. It is a matter of a national dialogue for the purpose of finding a formula for national reconciliation. Well, at a certain stage other interested parties including Vietnam may join in this dialogue.

One aspect of the Cambodian problem is, of course, the presence there of Vietnamese forces. Well, as you know, the Vietnamese forces in their time came to Cambodia's assistance in the struggle against the Pol Pot regime, which committed an unparalleled act of genocide against its own people, which was the bloodiest act in the history of Cambodia and indeed one of the bloodiest acts in world history. Vietnam has stated repeatedly -- in 1981, 1985, and 1986 -- that it is ready to withdraw its forces by 1990. Well, it would seem that naturally, this will be one of the points, and an important point, in the dialogue that is taking shape.

There has also been a shift, though not a very significant one, in the standpoint of the ASEAN countries, which are also creating the political backdrop for the Cambodian problem, and not only the backdrop, because they are greatly involved -- Thailand at least -- and are supporting the rebels. There too, views are being expressed, in particular following the visit to Vietnam by the Indonesian foreign minister, in favor of national reconciliation in Cambodia.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Thank you. If you please.

[Adamishin] Very well, but just a couple of words. It may seem, of course, that I am constantly advertising our policy, but we indeed have had an active role in the fact that there has been a start to more movement toward a settlement in that part of the globe. One may recall in this connection the Vladivostok speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich. One may also recall our course of, for instance, improving relations with China. Indeed it must be said, although it is dangerous to gloss over things, that some shifts have been appearing in China's position, including on the question of the situation concerning Cambodia. One may recall our minister's trip to the countries of the region. This is to say that we are endeavoring principledly and energetically to pursue our line of seeking a settlement to conflicts wherever they may be.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Anatoliy Leonidovich, I have here a whole series of questions concerning nuclear weapons. A number of comrades note in their questions that the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons is now a central issue. We know that a whole group of so-called near-nuclear states has appeared. Their number includes Israel, Pakistan, the RSA, and others. Is it not possible that nuclear weapons will be used in regional conflicts, which would create a threat for all the world? This is a big and serious issue. If you please.

[Adamishin] That is certainly so, and it must be said that the Soviet Union is doing everything within its power to see that this threat is not realized in practice. We are using all levers of influence to ensure that nuclear weapons do not spread throughout the world both in our bilateral contacts and in our work in international organizations. One must say that there is a considerable amount of anxiety in general in public opinion throughout the world in this regard. So let us hope that this creates, as they say, a shield in the way of these plans. As you realize the plans are, technically speaking, fully capable of being realized. It is a matter of preventing their realization with political means.

[Seyful-Mulyukov] Thank you. We have not been able, of course, in a single television program to cover sufficiently deeply and fully all the complex regional problems and conflicts. Each one of them is a subject for a monograph, for an incisive documentary film, and for a publicist book.

Summing up what has been said, I would like once again to stress that, despite all the complexity of composition, interests, clashes, traditions, and views the world is one and its security is indivisible. We are constantly emphasizing this. A direct limit for regional conflicts is at an end. This is why our country, in actively proposing the idea of a nuclear-free and nonviolent world is advocating the unblocking of regional conflicts wherever they occur, whether in the Near East, close to our southern borders, in Central America, in North Africa, or in the south of that continent, or in Southeast Asia.

At this point, permit me to bring our program to a close and to thank its participants and the viewers for giving their attention to our "Repercussions" program. Thank you and until our next meeting, comrades.

GERASIMOV HOLDS MOSCOW NEWS CONFERENCE 20 AUG

On Expulsion of Two Japanese

LD201301 Moscow TASS in English 1246 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- A representation was made to the Japanese ambassador to the USSR at the Soviet Foreign Ministry Wednesday [19 August] over a propaganda campaign hostile to this country, which is continuing in Japan, the ministry's spokesman said here today.

Gennadiy Gerasimov, chief of the Information Directorate at the USSR Foreign Ministry, told Soviet and foreign newsmen at a briefing that the Japanese ambassador had been told that the Soviet side had already expressed its principled view on that campaign which could harm Soviet-Japanese relations.

Nonetheless, Japanese authorities had disregarded the Soviet side's addresses, Gerasimov said. Actions were going on in Japan, he added, which were directed at fomenting an unhealthy situation around Soviet offices and their staff and the mass media there were continuing an uproar unfriendly to the Soviet Union.

The representation made to Japan's ambassador to the Soviet Union emphasized that this approach could only complicate relations between Japan and the USSR. All this was running counter to the Japanese leaders' declarations about the desire to promote relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side's attention was drawn again to the incompatibility with official status of individual Japanese respresentatives in the Soviet Union, including some employees of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow.

Facts attesting to such activity were recently established. The ambassador was told, specifically, that, according to information of Soviet competent bodies, the Japanese Embassy's Defence Attache T. Okamoto and Naval Attache N. Takeshima were engaged in intelligence activity in Odessa on July 29, 1987.

It was also announced that deputy head of the Moscow office of Mitsubishi Soji T. Otani had repeatedly attempted by unlawful means to obtain classified commercial information in the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR, engaged in speculation and violated the rules of stay and rules of travel on Soviet territory.

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs has strongly protested against these unlawful actions of Japanese citizens in the USSR and demanded of the Japanese side the adoption of proper measures to prevent such actions in the future. It was stated to the Japanese side that N. Takeshima's further stay in the Soviet Union was impossible. It was also suggested that T. Otani should leave the USSR.

Urges Forces To Leave Gulf

LD201352 Moscow TASS in English 1334 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- A month has passed since the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 598, but no progress has as yet been made in putting into into life, Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, told a briefing at the Soviet Foreign Ministry today.

"To move the decision of the authoritative international body into the plane of practical deeds, both Iraq and Iran should start the immediate fulfilment of all provisions of the resolution.

Iraq's consent to start complying with the resolution provisions evoked satisfaction in Moscow. Iran's expressed readiness to continue cooperation with the U.N. secretary-general deserves attention as well."

"There is a need for political common sense, a balanced approach and renuciation by all states of any actions leading to confrontation and complication settlement.

In this connection one cannot but be seriously alarmed by the U.S. actions that are running counter to Resolution 598.

The resolution calls for maximum restraint and abstention from any actions that might lead to the further escalation and broadening of the conflict, thus making it easier to implement the resolution.

The Soviet Union resolutely stands for the freedom of navigation and we denounce any actions posing a threat to this freedom, including mining," Gerasimov said.

"We believe it is necessary to start looking for a solution to the problem of demining within the context of international efforts to improve the situation in the region on the whole.

Such efforts, of course, should be combined with the withdrawal of the navies of the countries which are not of the Persian Gulf, except mine-sweepers which would stay in the Gulf for a definite period to clear the mines and ensure conditions for peaceful navigation."

On Shultz-Shevardnadze Meeting

LD2101414 Moscow TASS in English 1405 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- A correspondent of the U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT asked Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Directorate of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, at a briefing here today whether the meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, slated for Washington in mid-September, would be held.

"When we agreed with the American side about the meeting, the point at issue was that diplomats from the two countries will work hard to prepare the meeting properly so that it yield a result.

This implies, primarily, the need to adopt a decision on the problem of West German Pershing-1A missiles and American warheads to them, which is a touchstone showing the American side's desire to reach an agreement."

"As all signs indicate," the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said, "the American diplomats are in a holiday mood and they do not offer proposals that could help settle the problem.

There is, therefore, a doubt as to what we will have by September, by the time of the meeting. What the Soviet minister will have to offer and, in turn, what the U.S. secretary of state will be able to say in reply. [sentence as received]

The meeting should be better prepared," Gerasimov said. "At present, no proper efforts are being done for that."

On Pakistani Nuclear Program

LD201424 Moscow TASS in English 1412 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- Information coming in lately is enough reason to believe that Pakistan's realization of its nuclear progrm is getting it ever closer to the possession of nuclear weapons, the chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate said here today.

Gennadiy Gerasimov told Soviet and foreign correspondents at a briefing that how serious the situation was had been indicated by the U.S. Government's decision to "freeze" military and economic aid to Pakistan for three months, although the United States had for years effectively pandered to Islamabad's nuclear ambitions, despite its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

"The appearance of nuclear weapons in Pakistan's possession would mean a fundamentally different situation in the region of South and South West Asia and in the world as a whole," Gerasimov said.

"With developments taking this course, the Soviet Union cannot remain an impartial observer and the Soviet side has repeatedly made this known to Pakistan and a number of other countries, most notably the United States," the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said.

On Recent Talks With Israel

LD201439 Moscow TASS in English 1420 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- The recent meeting in Bonn between representatives of the Foreign Ministries of the USSR and Israel was a component part of efforts directed at putting the convocation of the international conference on the Middle East on a practical basis, a briefing at the Soviet Foreign Ministry's press centre today was told by Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate.

The meeting concentrated on problems of a Middle East settlement.

Our side confirmed the USSR's principled approach to Middle East affairs and stressed that the road to achieving an all-embracing and just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and its key problem -- the Palestinian one, passes through the convocation of a plenipotentiary conference on the Middle East with the participation of all interested sides, including Israel and the PLO and the permanent member states of the United Nations Security Council, Gennadiy Gerasimov said.

Our invariable stand in the question of restoring relations with Israel was confirmed: Changes in these relations are conceivable only in the channel of the Middle East settlement, he said further.

Concerning the trip by a group of Soviet consular officials to Israel Gennadiy Gerasimov reiterated that the Soviet side did not see a basis for reciprocity because there is no Israeli property in the USSR nor permanently residing Israeli citizens.

The Soviet Union firmly and consistently comes out for the speediest settlement of the conflict situation in the Middle East by way of collective international efforts, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said further. For this purpose the Soviet side maintains regular contacts with Arab countries and the PLO, as well as with the United Staes, Britain, France and the PRC.

On 'Attempted' Suicide of Hess

LD201449 Moscow TASS in English 1437 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- An investigation by competent authorities of the death of Rudolf Hess, one of the main Nazi criminals, in Spandau Prison on August 17 showed that he had attempted to commit suicide, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Gennadiy Gerasimov told today a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists.

On that day Hess, who was sentenced for life by the Nuremberg tribunal, went on a walk after midday under the supervision of a warder and entered a small house in the prison garden. When the warder looked into it several minutes later, he saw Hess with an electric cord around his neck. Resuscitation measures were taken and Hess was brought to a British military hospital. After measures to revive Hess were taken he was declared dead at 16.10.

The Western advocates of Hess, who was one of the main architects of German Nazism's "death machine", have more than once called on the USSR to show humaneness and consent to his release.

But they forgot, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman said, that the full measure of punishment for the Nazi criminal precisely was the highest expression of humaneness and justice to his victims, to all the peoples, including the German people, who suffered from fascism.

On U.S. View of Double Zero

LD201532 Moscow TASS in English 1510 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- Washington's inflexible and obviously destructive position nullifies its assertions that a "double-zero option" would make it possible to finalize a draft treaty on the problem, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov said here today.

Speaking at a briefing for Soviet and foreign correspondents, Gerasimov, who heads the ministry's Information Directorate, said that over the past month the U.S. delegation had not made a single specific proposal for speeding work even on such an advanced problem as that of eliminating medium-range and shorter-range missiles.

"Moreover, it has been avoiding finding a solution to remove what is a major stumbling block at the talks -- the issue of scrapping U.S. nuclear warheads for West German Pershing-1A shorter-range missiles," he added.

The U.S. delegation, the Soviet spokesman said, had not responded to this day to a Soviet proposal for a phased elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles, a proposal which had taken into account the interests of both sides.

"Neither has the American [side] been active in coming to terms on also other outstanding issues," he continued.

That, Gerasimov added, "Can hardly testify to an interest in the productivity of the future meeting of the foreign ministers of the USSR and the United States and this cannot but arouse concern, especially considering the short time remaining before the meeting."

The Western press had reported that, in view of the possible treaty on medium-range and shorter-range missiles, NATO circles were studying options for "compensating" deployments of American nuclear arms, he said.

That included moving a significant number of F-111 and FB-111 planes to Britain and re-aiming part of the Poseidon warheads on U.S. submarines to zero in on targets now covered by Pershing-1's and cruise missiles, among other possibilities, Gerasimov said.

"Talking about any compensation is absurd. The medium-range and shorter-range missiles under the proposal being discussed are to be scrapped by two sides -- the Soviet Union and the United States.

"If these plans are really adopted, it would be more correct to speak not of compensation but of a unilateral buildup.

"It is in effect the same idea of "zero plus", which the U.S. and the F.R.G. are now pushing in relation to the 72 American warheads for West German Pershing-1A missiles. the zero is meant for East, while the zero plus 72 for West," Gerasimov explained.

FURTHER ON END OF BORDER TALKS WITH PRC

LD210702 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0630 GMT 21 Aug 87

[Text] Beijing, 21 Aug (TASS) -- Following an accord, the second round of Soviet-Chinese talks on border questions took place in Beijing from 7 to 21 August. The Soviet Government delegation was headed by Igor Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister; the Chinese delegation was headed by Qian Qichen, PRC vice minister of foreign affairs.

During the talks, the Soviet and Chinese sides discussed questions concerning the eastern part of the Soviet-Chinese border. The two sides are in favor of resolving questions on the eastern part of the border rationally. This can be done on the basis of appropriate treaties on the present Soviet-Chinese border, in accordance with the principle of demarcation along the center of the main channels of navigable rivers, and along the center of or the main artery of nonnavigable rivers.

The two sides agreed that in addition to continuing border talks at delegation level, a working group of experts will be created for the specific consideration of the course of the whole length of its eastern border. The talks took place in a calm [spokoyny] and businesslike atmosphere. The two sides believe that the talks are useful for deepening mutual understanding and contributing to the solution of border questions between the Soviet Union and China.

The Soviet Government delegation, headed by I. Rogachev, today left Beijing for Moscow.

PRC DELEGATION STUDIES NATIONAL RELATIONS IN RIGA

PM201036 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Aug 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Latvia's Guests"]

[Text] Riga, 19 Aug -- Over a 4-day period a delegation of the Chinese National People's Congress [NPC] nationalities commission familiarized itself with the social, cultural, and production life of the Latvian capital.

The work of soviet organs in a national republic is of particular interest to us, the leader of the delegation, Yu Wen, member of the NPC Standing Committee, told a TASS correspondent. The problems of coexistence between representatives of various ethnic groups are relevant and understandable to us, he said, and we hope to take the experience in resolving them that we have seen here and apply it to our own lives.

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE TOLD TO LEAVE JAPAN

OW201419 Tokyo KYODO in English 1404 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Tokyo, Aug. 20 KYODO -- Japan Thursday told vice Soviet trade representative in Tokyo Yuriy Pokrovskiy who was allegedly involved in an illegal purchase of aircraft documents to leave the country as quickly as possible, a Foreign Ministry official said. Kazutoshi Hasegawa, director general of the Foreign Ministry's European and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, gave the notice to Yuriy Kuznetsov, Soviet charge d'affaires in Tokyo, at the Foreign Ministry.

The order followed the Soviet announcement in Moscow earlier in the day that two Japanese -- Nobuhiro Takeshima, a defense attache, and Takao Otani, deputy head of Mitsubishi Corp.'s Moscow office had been told to leave the Soviet Union for what the Soviet said were deeds incompatible with their status. A ministry official said, however, that Japanese action was not related to Moscow's announcement.

Hasegawa told Kuznetsov that Japan had asked Pokrovsky to appear for police questioning for his alleged involvement in an illegal buying of technical data on flight management system stolen by a Japanese from Tokyo Aircraft Instrument Co., but he had not complied with the Japanese request so far. The Soviet side has not taken proper measures on the matter as well, Hasegawa said he told the Soviet diplomat. "Because of this, Pokrovskiy will be unable to stay further in Japan although Japan does not regard him as persona non grata," Hasegawa said.

Kuznetsov told Hasegawa Pokrovskiy did not engage in illegal activities and that the Japanese request was made without a reason. He said he had to express regret over the Japanese action as it will worsen bilateral relations. But Kuznetsov said he will convey the Japanese request to his government.

A government official said Moscow's announcement about the two Japanese was regrettable and it will hamper improvement of relations between the two nations.

NEWSPAPER CITED ON U.S.-JAPANESE NUCLEAR ACCORD

LD200907 Moscow TASS in English 1216 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Tokyo August 20 TASS -- A new Japanese-U.S. agreement on nuclear energy is to be signed soon, possibly by November this year, the newspaper DAILY YOMIURI quotes a representative of the Japanese Foreign Ministry as saying. The new agreement considerably broadens Japan's potential to use nuclear fuel and weakens control over it by the USA.

Agreement on signing a new accord was reached way back in 1982. Yet the talks have been protracted because of the objections from the Pentagon and a number of congressmen fearing that plutonium produced at Japan's nuclear power stations might he used for the production of nuclear weapons. Reports have appeared in the U.S. press that Japan already has the technology and materials for the production of such weapons.

Under the treaty in effect now the USA will grant Japan nuclear technology and materials for use in the national power industry. In return Washington will get guarantees that the Japanese nuclear programmes will not be used for the production of weapons.

NOVOSTI'S PUSHKOV INTERVIEWED ON INFORMATION POLICY

AU171111 Warsaw SZTANDAR MLODYCH in Polish 14-16 Aug 87 p 7

[Interview with Aleksey Pushkov, deputy chairman of the board of NOVOSTI and director of the NOVOSTI Publishing House, by Waldemar Siwinski: "We Are Not Concerned With Thick Volumes" -- date and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Siwinski] The letters APN are to be seen more and more frequently in publications in various languages. The world's press agencies regularly refer to the APN weekly MOSKOSKIYE NOVOSTI. Your journals KRAJ RAD [LAND OF THE SOVIETS] and MLODOSC [YOUTH] are becoming increasingly popular in Poland. What is APN today?

[Pushkov] Today, the NOVOSTI Press Agency is, as always, the mouthpiece of Soviet society's views. That is the purpose for which it was founded in 1961 by four organizations: the Union of Writers, the Union of Journalists, the "Znaniye" Society of Knowledge, and the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cooperation with Foreign Countries. Our energy is largely based on the energy of the members of these organizations. [passage omitted]

[Siwinski] What new tasks are facing APN today? What do you have to change in your work?

[Pushkov] We have had the same problems as the Soviet press. We glamorized many things. We tried to present abroad what was best in our country. We employed the "principle of a hostess," an aging hostess whose house is untidy and who sweeps the dirt under the carpet just before the guests arrive. That is the kind of tidied facade we tried to present. This is being criticized with justification, because as a result of it readers used to read one thing and see another thing in reality.

APN happened to be in a better situation than the domestic press, because it was writing abroad and had to remember that its readership was more critical. We were the ones who received letters accusing us of painting over reality. I remember when French Communists came to us 15 years ago and complained: Why do you write that your tomatoes are the reddest and your cucumbers the greenest in the world?!

Because of this our articles had to be somewhat bolder than those in the domestic press. But today, this advantage of ours already belongs to the past, because the standard of the daily press has increased. We are in the face of competition. This has turned out to be advantageous for MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. [passage omitted]

[Siwinski] What methods of informing world society about what is happening in the Soviet Union do you in APN consider to be the most effective?

[Pushkov] Right now our resources and possibilities are limited to the written word. After all, what do we do? We prepare articles and publish books and journals like KRAJ RAD and MLODOSC. Our ambition is to make the best use of these forms of activity. We are not concerned with publishing thick volumes. We want to publish small-format works, but we want to do so quickly. [passage omitted]

[Siwinski] What will Polish readers receive from APN that is new?

[Pushkov] Our most ambitious undertaking is "Who's Who in Soviet Education, Science, and Culture," which is being prepared jointly with INTERPRESS.

[Siwinski] Such a book is much needed.

[Pushkov] Certainly. But it is a very difficult task to select 3,000 names. The Soviet Union of Writers alone has 9,000 members. And what about scholars, artists, and actors? All of them are ambitious, yet there will not be room for everyone. They will be dissatisfied -- but we have already managed to come to terms with this. The first Polish-Soviet "Who's Who" should see the light of day by 1990.

CPSU SENDS CONDOLENCES ON DEATH OF ROMANIA'S ENACHE

LD192014 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1830 GMT 19 Aug 87

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee has expressed its deep condolences to the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party with regard to the death of Enache, candidate member of the Polexco, secretary of the Central Committee, and vice president of the State Council of Romania. Sincere condolences have been passed on to the relatives and close friends of the deceased.

MSZMP PAPER STRESSES ROLE OF PARTY DEMOCRACY

PM191525 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 12 Aug 87 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent M. Podklyuchnikov report under the rubric "Fraternal Newspapers: From the Latest Issue": "NEPSZABADSAG"]

[Text] Budapest -- The constant development of socialist democracy and the improvement of the system of political institutions are an essential condition for fulfilling the program for Hungary's economic and social development adopted at the MSZMP Central Committee July (1987) Plenum, NEPSZABADSAG writes today.

The historical experience of Hungarian society during the years of socialist building, the newspaper notes, clearly shows that the development of socialist democracy and the state of democracy within the party have always been closely interlinked. The expansion of party democracy has unfailingly helped to develop social democracy.

The further development of party democracy, the newspaper points out, is a matter for society as a whole. It relates to Hungary's national interests and is not simply a "private concern" for party members alone. The changes going on today in Hungary and throughout the world challenge society and above all its leading force -- the MSZMP -- with complicated new tasks. The paper concludes: There is only one way to meet these challenges -- the further development of democracy within the party, which helps broaden socialist democracy and achieve the aims of Hungary's socioeconomic development.

POLITBURO ON RESTRUCTURING COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

LD201954 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Aug 87

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] At the CPSU Central Committee Politburo: At a session held on 20 August, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo discussed improving work in the USSR Council of Ministers and restructuring its administrative apparatus [apparat]. The specific proposals prepared by the government, which constitute part of the comprehensive program for radically restructuring the management of the economy -- elaborated in accordance with the decisions by the 27th party congress, and of the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum -- were approved.

It is envisaged that the level of activity of all organs of the USSR Council of Ministers will be significantly raised and directed toward implementing effective steps to accelerate the development of the country's economy, and toward more fully satisfying the people's needs.

A decision was adopted which established tasks to substantially improve the work of the government apparatus in keeping with current party demands, and defined its new structure. The administrative apparatus staff has been reduced.

The Politburo considered further developing Soviet architecture and town planning. The decision by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers on this issue envisions measures to raise the level of architecture, improve the planning of city and village construction, improve the economic mechanism, and strengthen incentives regarding project quality. The great importance of architecture and town planning in the moral and aesthetic education of Soviet people was stressed. To improve the organizational structure of the management of architecture and town planning, it is considered expedient to set up a single system of union-republican management organs, and to transform the State Committee for Civil Construction and Architecture of the USSR State Construction Committee -- the Gosgrazhdanstroy -- into the State Committee for Architecture and Town Planning of the USSR State Construction Committee, Goskomarkhitektura.

The proposal by the USSR Council of Ministers and the AUCCTU on the introduction of voluntary insurance to provide an additional pension for workers, office workers, and collective farm workers was approved. Such insurance will be a major social step by the state to improve the living conditions of labor veterans. The source for the payment of the additional pension will be an insurance fund, formed out of personal subscriptions by the insurants, and resources from the USSR state budget.

At the session, issues connected with the participation of a Soviet delegation at the forthcoming 42d UN General Assembly session were considered.

The CPSU Central Committee Politburo also discussed other questions of social and economic development and of the development of contacts with foreign countries, and adopted relevant decisions on them.

CPSU, GOVERNMENT RESOLUTION ON JOURNALISTS' UNION

PM201358 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Aug 87 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee has adopted a resolution "On Measures To Strengthen the Material Base and Improve the Conditions of the Activity of the USSR Journalists' Union."

With a view to stepping up the work of the mass information and propaganda media in restructuring the socioeconomic and spiritual life of Soviet society, the CPSU Central Committee has drawn up additional measures to strengthen the material base and improve the conditions of the activity of the USSR Journalists' Union. The USSR Journalism Foundation has been set up, attached to the USSR Journalists' Union. It is laid down that the resources of the USSR Journalism Foundation are formed out of deductions set at 6 percent of the author's honorarium paid by newspaper and journal editorial offices, publishing houses, the USSR Council of Ministers Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, the NOVOSTI Press Agency, and television and radio organs (with the exception of an honorarium out of which deductions are paid into the funds of other creative unions). The USSR Journalists' Union Board is instructed, by agreement with the USSR Ministry of Justice, the USSR Ministry of Finance, and the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, to establish the regulations, structure, strength, and salaries of workers of the USSR Journalism Foundation.

Other measures were outlined to strengthen the material base of the USSR Journalists' Union.

The CPSU Central Committee approved a draft USSR Council of Ministers order on this question.

In the USSR Council of Ministers order which was adopted, the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution "On Improving the Conditions of the Activity of Creative Unions" is extended to apply to the USSR Journalists' Union as far as pénsion provision is concerned.

The USSR Council of Ministers instructed the USSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade to set up at the Mysl Publishing house an editorial office for the preparation and publication of literature on the theory, history, and practice of the activity of the mass media and the methodology and organization of the labor of press workers, textbooks, reference works, and also anthologies of the best current affairs work by journalists.

The USSR Gosplan is instructed to make provision in draft plans, beginning in 1988, for the allocation to the USSR Journalists' Union of capital investment quotas for strengthening and developing the material and technical base and building houses for creative work, boarding houses, leisure bases, and sanitoriums out of the union's own resources.

The USSR Council of Ministers instructed union republic Councils of Ministers, krayispolkoms, oblispolkoms, and Moscow Gorispolkom to make provision in the plans for 1988-1995 for the construction of cooperative apartment blocks for journalists, including small apartment blocks in rural rayon centers. The Moscow Gorispolkom is instructed to ensure in 1988 the completion of work on the capital repair of the Central House of Journalists.

GLASNOST SAYS STALIN PURGE FILES BEING DESTROYED

AU210707 Paris AFP in English 0623 GMT 21 Aug 87

[Sylvie Kauffmann Report]

[Text] Moscow, Aug 21 (AFP) -- Soviet legal files from the 1930s, '40s and '50s are being destroyed at the rate of 5,000 dossiers a month on the pretext that there "is no room" to keep them, the dissident newspaper GLASNOST says in its latest issue.

The paper, published since July by former political detainees, said files on millions of Soviet victims of Stalin's purges are stored in the archives of the Military College (Tribunal) and the Supreme Court.

Many such files had already been "cleaned out from the public prosecutor's office and the Justice Ministry during the 1960s and 1970s", GLASNOST said. "As for the KGB files, virtually no-one knows where they are kept."

For several years, GLASNOST said two presidents of the Supreme Court named Gorkin and Smirnov managed "to save the files from destruction". But "when the (former) Minister of Justice, Vladimir Terebilov became president of the Supreme Court, with as his first deputy, Sergey Gusev, the 'ditching' of the files suddenly began," and has continued for the past two years. Mr. Terebilov and his deputy were appointed to the Supreme Court in April 1984.

"At the moment, filing clerks at the Military College are getting rid of the dossiers of 1940, those at the Supreme Court, the dossiers from 1948-49. Some of the files are transfered to the archives of the KGB despite rules banning the transfer of files from one department to another," GLASNOST said.

At first the files were burned in the chimney of the Supreme Court building. But, GLASNOST noted: "1,500 dossiers burned during one Subotnik (day of "voluntary" work generally on Saturdays) makes a lot of smoke in the city. Now they are incinerated outside Moscow."

Mr. Gusev decided the work was going too slowly and asked the clerks "to speed up the pace" in order to get rid of 1,000 dossiers a month instead of 750. Five filing clerks now manage to destroy 5,000 dossiers a month, adding up to two or three years of files per year, the dissident publication said.

"The whole 'clean up' operation of the files is expected to be completed in 1992," GLASNOST said. "Many Soviet historians know that is happening but they keep silent," the paper said.

It published a letter founder editor Sergey Grigoryants wrote to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on July 27 asking him to intervene to "safeguard the memory of tens of millions of Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Uzbeks who dissappeared during the Stalin terror." Mr. Grigoryants also appealed to historians the world over to take action to save the files. "Without action we cannot hope to avoid a new Stalinism," he said.

MARSHAL ZHUKOV'S MEMOIRS PUBLISHED, RECALL STALIN

AU210912 Paris AFP in English 0846 GMT 21 Aug 87

[Text] MOSCOW, Aug 20 (AFP) -- In the years 1939 to 1940, Soviet military chiefs were aware that their Armed Forces were unready for war but were afraid to say so for fear of Stalin and his political police chief Beria, according to the memoirs of Marshal Georgiy Zhukov, extracts of which are published here this week.

Marshal Zhukov, one of the top defence chiefs of the time, "believed that Stalin and his closest aides, Molotov, Malenkov and Kaganovich were jointly responsible for the mistakes made at the beginning of the war," according to journalist Konstantin Simonov who collated the memoirs for the MILITARY BULLETIN of NOVOSTI News Agency.

Marshal Zhukov said Stalin's three deputies "were not always the docile executants of his wishes. On more than one occasion, they opposed Stalin's suggestions about boosting defences and the equipment of the Army."

After the war against Finland which lasted from the end of 1939 to the beginning of 1940, Stalin told Zhukov of his bitterness towards Marshal Voroshilov who, he said, had "vaunted" the Red Army's state of preparedness.

"The Finnish war showed up the Red Army's weak points," Mr. Simonov said adding that in the words of Marshal Zhukov, this was the result of the mass purges of 1937 and 1938.

Marshal Zhukov, who died in 1974, acknowledged that he and other military leaders "many of whom held doubts about Stalin's decisions" should have insisted on better preparation for the Army. "But the memory of the events of 1937-38 was still sharp.... to tell Stalin that he was wrong could have meant being taken for coffee with Beria before being able to leave the building."

However Marshal Zhukov admitted that fear was not the only reason why he kept silent: "I had great faith in Stalin, in his political skill and in his ability to find a way out of the most difficult situations," he wrote.

Marshal Zhukov, who was in charge of Moscow's defence during the Second World War and who marched into Warsaw in 1945 after letting the German Army crush a Polish uprising, said Germany had "a colossal military and industrial superiority" over the Soviet Union when they went to war in 1941.

The memoirs also evoke Molotov's personality: his "cruelty", his stubbornness and the way he would smile gently when Stalin flew into one of his tempers. "Molotov followed Stalin by conviction, while Malenkov and Kaganovich were only thinking of their careers," Marshal Zhukov was quoted as saying.

TURKMEN PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM MEETS

PM201249 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 16 Aug 87 Second Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent M. Volkov on Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee Plenum under the general heading: "Overcoming Inertia; Communists Discuss the Decisions of the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum"]

[Text] Ashkhabad -- Perhaps no previous Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee plenum has been as self-critical as this one which discussed problems of accelerating and deepening restructuring and introducing a new economic mechanism in the light of the demands of the CPSU Central Committee June Plenum.

The following figures were cited in the report by S. Niyazov, Turkmen Communist Party Central Committee first secretary. According to the results of the first 6 months of the year, one in six enterprises in the republic failed to fulfill delivery contracts, one in five failed to meet the labor productivity target, and one in three failed to fulfill the profits plan. The situation is no better in construction. The construction of 45 out of 65 very important facilities is behind schedule. There have been few marked advances in agricultural production.

So why is the republic's national economy idling instead of accelerating? The discussion showed that the main reason for the lag is to be found in the fact that the republican party organization has not yet given due depth and scope to work on the radical restructuring of economic management. It is still affected, on the one hand, by the old way of approaching the solution of socioeconomic tasks, and, on the other hand, by the parasitic mentality that has developed. Particularly intolerable is the passivity of leaders who are not taking advantage of new opportunities for improving matters and want to take as much as possible from the state without bothering to make effective use of the available potential.

Everyone who mounted the plenum rostrum and talked about restructuring invariably reproached the republican party organization's leading organ. The gist of the reproaches is that the Central Committee, its Bureau, and the Secretariat have not yet managed to create a united front of struggle for acceleration in all areas and economic managers continue to chorus about shortcomings and failures, putting them down to objective difficulties. It is necessary, speakers demanded, to do away once and for all with this unsuitable work style and assume greater responsibility for solving fundamental questions.

In my view, V. Rebrik, secretary of Chardzhou Obkom, said, what Central Committee departments lack is a thorough analysis of the current situation in the national economy. Often Central Committee department chiefs and secretaries spend an excessive amount of time studying trivial, routine matters, whereas the cardinal problems, on which the republic's future progress depends are treated as an afterthought.

Workers in the republican apparatus are also characterized by their disdainful attitude toward proposals from the localities. R. Zatiryukina, foreman at the No 3 construction administration of the "Sredazneftegazmontazh" Trust, voiced concern in her speech. In her view, many errors occur because primary party organizations often remain on the fringe of restructuring. But it is here, in labor collectives, that the struggle to attain the main aims is developing. [paragraph continues]

The time has come to assess primary party organizations not in terms of accountability reports and whether meetings are held and membership dues are paid promptly, but in terms of their actual authority in the collective, their efficiency, and quest for and utilization of active forms and methods of work.

It was pointed out that all party committees are seriously engaged in the restructuring test, but with varying degrees of success. The report sharply criticized the Krasnovodsk and Tashauz Gorkoms and Kushkinskiy, Serakhskiy, and Dargan-Atinskiy Raykoms. In these organizations they come across as ardent champions of restructuring, but when it comes to concrete action, they play a blatant waiting game. It is no accident that in these and other rayons the switch to full economic accountability is slow, modernization of fixed capital is inconsistent, and little effort is made to introduce intensive techniques in the fields. As in the past, routine economic preoccupations take center stage.

Typically, Ye. Mitrin and Ch. Gedzhenov, first secretaries of Krasnovodsk and Mari Obkoms, speaking in the debate, sidestepped questions of strengthening political leadership and improving the efficiency of primary party organizations and clearly overrated the activity of their gorkoms and raykoms, although it would seem rather early to be preening oneself on having been successful. Both oblasts have banked on buying livestock products from the population and have neglected the development of public-sector livestock raising.

The plenum analyzed the problem of the rural economy in the light of the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On the unsatisfactory exploitation of the natural and economic potential of the agro-industrial complex in Uzbek SSR, Tajik SSR, and Turkmen SSR." It was noted that the parasitic mentality is still strong in a number of rayon leaders when it comes to providing the population with foodstuffs. Yes, the Turkmen cotton growers certainly have made a contribution. This year the farms plan to harvest on average at least 21 quintals [area not specified] of the valuable raw material, but Turkmenistan is not only rich in cotton. In the republic there are many examples of multiple farming activities, where feed crops are being cultivated as well as cotton and livestock raising is developing successfully. However, by no means have all the rural leaders drawn the proper conclusions. The plenum participants sharply criticized the chairmen of leading kolkhozes who have done little so far to provide local workers with enough milk and meat.

Each of the speakers deemed it his duty to talk about untapped reserves for increasing production of vegetable and melon crops. Sunny Turkmenistan certainly is a fine area for growing a wide range of nourishing products. Unfortunately, at the moment the production volumes are lower than the specified targets.

The following instance was cited. They used to send excellent melons daily from Tedzhenskiy Rayon to Ashkhabad, but there was a shortage in the stores. Why? After a careful check it was established that they had been bought up and sold on the market. Abuses in the procurements and sales are serious obstacles to improving consumer food supplies. So it is fair to criticize many law-enforcement organs for waging an incompetent and inefficient struggle against theft and machinations.

There was a sharp discussion at the plenum of the topic of unemployment. There are more than enough labor resources in the republic. How and in what area is one to employ people who are fit for work? The question was elucidated in detail at the previous Central Committee plenum, where omissions and shortcomings were identified and detailed measures were approved. Of course, there has not been enough time to radically rectify the situation. [paragraph continues]

But it is already clear that the work to implement the measures is poor. Why? Lack of initiative, inertia, passivity. New forms of management and progressive labor organization methods -- a multishift system for enterprises, the creation of various cooperatives, the development of individual labor activity, and the expansion of the family contract -- would help to solve the problem.

In this connection the plenum considered from a critical standpoint the work style of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers and other republican central organs. In economic reform conditions they absolutely must improve their work methods, increase initiative and responsibility, create a more democratic atmosphere, and stop doing things just for show. Everywhere, particularly in soviet institutions, it is necessary to establish efficient and businesslike work procedures in connection with citizens' requests and suggestions. A determined effort must be made to eradicate formalism, red tape and indifference toward people, it was specially noted at the plenum.

The plenum participants approved the decisions of the CPSU Central Committe Plenum. A specific program to implement them was outlined.

PRAVDA FEATURES KAZAKH HOUSING ROUNDTABLE

PM201545 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 August 1987 Second Edition carries on pages 1-2, under the headline "Kazakhstan: Large New Housing Developments; Participants in a PRAVDA 'Round Table' Discuss the Progress in the Fulfillment of the Republic's 'Housing '91' Program at the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee," a full-page feature on a roundtable discussion held in Alma-Ata on an unspecified date to debate solutions to the housing problem in Kazakhstan. The feature is accompanied by the following unattributed introduction:

"Happy smiles, joy on faces, apartment keys clutched tightly... Both editors and newspaper readers like such photographs. But the same readers have noticed that such pictures appear in the press nearer the end of the year, when construction workers are 'pushing ahead' with housing commissioning.

"In the Kazakh press these pictures are published in the spring and summer. On the very day that a PRAVDA 'roundtable' session was being held at the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee the Alma-Ata Oblast newspaper featured a photo report on how construction workers at the 'Almaatazhilstroy' Trust had handed over a 60-apartment block to its new inhabitants.

"The party hass set the task of providing every Soviet family with a separate apartment or individual home by the year 2000. It is one of the core tasks of the restructuring currently taking place in all spheres of the country's life.

"The acuteness of the housing problem is felt everywhere, but it was particularly noticeable in Kazakhstan. The housing list was moving slowly, and many families have ramshackle apartments without facilities.

"The start of restructuring in Kazakhstan was delayed. Only with the change in leadership at the republic's Communist Party Central Committee were changes implemented.

"What is restructuring producing? What are its fruits? There are many signs of innovation in the republic's life. The economy is developing steadily, and industrial and agricultural production is growing noticeably. [paragraph continues]

"But people are gratified above all by the changes which concern them directly. There have never been so many new housing projects in the republic as have been greeted in the first 7 months of this year.

"This fact shows yet again that, if party committees really tackle the resolution of the problem, skillfully mobilize people, do not wait like parasites for someone to do some job or another, and seek out unutilized reserves, the results will be plain to see.

"The republic has developed and is implementing the comprehensive 'Housing '91' program. This experience is undoubtedly worthy of attention, and it -- together with the problems still to be solved -- formed the subject of the conversation at the PRAVDA 'roundtable' session held the other day at the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee.

"Taking part in the conversation were: G.V. Kolbin, first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee; Yu.A. Meshcheryakov, secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee; A.A. Ustinov, chief of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee Propaganda and Agitation Department; V.V. Sidorov, deputy chairman of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium; N.A. Nazarbayev, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers; K.A. Abdullayev, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Gosplan; A.I. Bektemisov, chairman of the Kazakh SSR Gosstroy; E.M. Zhakselekov, chairman of the Kazakh Trade Union Association; I.I. Davydov, secretary of Kustanay Kazakh Communist Party Obkom; Yu.V. Gremyachenskiy, secretary of Kokchetav Kazakh Communist Party Obkom; V.R. Krasnyanskiy, chief of the Main Administration for Construction in Alma-Ata; M.A. Ter-Vartanov, Kazakh SSR first deputy minister of highways; A.S. Kulenov, director of the Ust-Kamenogorsk Lead and Zinc Combine; E.K. Nurkadilov, chairman of the Alma-Ata Gorispolkom; K.A. Shopanayev, team leader at the 'Almaatakultbytstroy' Trust; S.V. Tolkuyev, chairman of the 'Otrar' Youth Housing Complex Organizing Committee; V.I. Kuznetsov, welder at the S.M. Kirov Plant; and M. Kazybayev, plasterer at the Kzyl-Orda Oblast Agro-Industrial Construction Association."

OFFICIAL RESPONDS TO ARTICLE ON DRA VETERANS

PM201453 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Aug 87 Second Edition p 2

[Response from Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Secretary A. Titarenko under the rubric "PRAVDA Spoke Out. What Has Been Done"? "'I Did Not Send You to Afghanistan...'"]

[Text] The article under this headline (PRAVDA for 5 August) has been examined by the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. It is noted that the piece rightly criticizes instances of an indifferent, formal, and bureaucratic attitude toward internationalist servicemen and their families. These disgraceful instances became possible as a result of the blunted sense of responsibility of leading workers in the Kovel, Pavlograd, and Sevastopol Gorkoms, the corresponding ispolkoms, and economic organs and the slackening of monitoring by the Volyn, Dnepropetrovsk, and Crimean Obkoms of the rigorous fulfillment of the demands of the party and government for an improvement in the working, living, and consumer service conditions of servicemen who have fulfilled their international duty and their families.

It has been noted that the bureaus of the Volyn, Dnepropetrovsk, and Crimean Obkoms made a principled assessment of the displays of callousness, indifference, and red tape. [paragraph continues]

R.E. Gerasimov, chairman of the Kovel Gorispolkom, was severely reprimanded and had his record endorsed, and S.M. Gorbachevskaya, secretary of the Kovel Gorkom, and I.N. Prikhodko, chairman of the Pavlograd Gorispolkom, were reprimanded. Party proceedings were also instituted against I.A. Solovyev, first secretary of the Pavlograd Gorkom, and Yu.I. Kuts and L.A. Bukhovtsev, deputy chairmen of the Kovel Gorispolkom. The questions raised by A.N. Shevchenko and P.M. Baranovskiy have been favorably resolved by local organs. L.A. Platonov, living in a suburb of the city of Sevastopol, has been registered for an apartment on preferential terms.

A check conducted in other oblasts of the republic has shown that some party committees, local ispolkoms, economic leaders, and trade union and Komsomol organizations still tolerate serious shortcomings in this work, which is of the greatest political and moral significance.

The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee demanded that obkoms and the Kiev Gorkom step up monitoring of the fulfillment of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolutions on privileges for servicemen, workers, and employees who have served in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in the DRA and their families and enhance the personal accountability for this of leaders of soviet and economic organs.

Party and Komsomol organizations are recommended to involve internationalist servicemen more extensively in social and political life and educational work with young people and create everywhere an atmosphere of universal respect for their military exploit and labor achievements.

MORE ON REACTION TO WESTERN COVERAGE OF BALTIC

CIA 'Sabotage'

LD202141 Moscow TASS in English 1844 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- TASS news analyst Konstantin Nilov writes:

The broader the scope of the democratization process in the USSR and the more firmly the atmosphere of openness affirms itself in our country, the more active and elaborate attempts are made by certain forces in the West to discredit this positive process and use it for their selfish political ends. A further confirmation of this has been served by an outcry raised lately in connection with an anniversary of the admission of the Soviet Baltic Republics -- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia -- into the USSR. The bourgeois, first of all American, press is literally rife with all manner of fabrications and distortions of the historical truth. Not a day passes without the Voice of America, and other foreign radio services, going on the air with another portion of concoctions designed to mispresent the life of the peoples of the Soviet Baltic region and sow nationalist sentiment.

The guidelines, main parameters and tone of this hostile campaign has been set by U.S. ruling quarters. It would be relevant to recall in this connection that a little over two months ago, on June 14, U.S. President R. Reagan, observing the so-called "Baltic Freedom Day" proclaimed by Washington, signed a proclamation that amounted to an attempt at crude interference in the affairs of the USSR. Declaring that the U.S. Government "has never recognized, nor will we, the Soviet Union's illegal and forcible incorporation of the Baltic states", the White House occupant threatened that the United States would continue "to use every opportunity" to support the rights of the Baltic nations.

If one analyzes the methods used by the initiators of the anti-Soviet uproar, it would not be difficult to see that slanderously picturing the state of affairs in the Soviet Baltic region, they are especially zealous in their attempts to falsify the history of the Soviet Baltic republics. It is known well that in Latvia a Soviet Government was formed way back in late 1917 and that in Lithuania Soviet power was established in 1918-19 and in Estonia in 1918. As far as the so-called "independence" of these republics is concerned, it was brought there on the Kaiser's bayonets: Interventionists who flooded captured lands with blood started realizing their plans to annex the region. In 1940, fulfilling the sovereign will of their nations, the parliaments of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia spoke out for joining the USSR.

"It is only in the family of the nations of the Soviet Union that Latvia will be able to heal the wounds received over the long years of slavery; it is only with the help of its great friend -- the USSR -- and as a fully-fledged member of the Soviet Union that the Lettish people will be able to advance its economy, develop its national culture, ensure national equality, and ensure peace, bread and true freedom for Latvia's working people," the Latvian people's Sejm stressed in a resolution. Carrying corresponding proposals, plenipotentiary delegations arrived in Moscow for a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Their members included such prominent and authoritative politicians and public figures as Ju. Paleckis (Lithuania) and Dr. A. Kirhenstein (Latvia), among others.

Such are facts, but it would be futile to look for them in the torrent of propaganda "products" pouring out from the West. The history of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania has been shown there in a distorting mirror, more precisely twisted beyond recognition.

Speaking of the history of the Soviet Baltic region, one should not, of course, fail to remember the plans hatched out with regard to it by the leaders of Hitler's Reich. "The objective of the imperial authorized agent in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Belorussia should be to create a German protectorate so that later to make these areas part of the great German empire through the Germanization of racially suitable elements, colonization by representatives of the German race, and the extermination of undesirable elements," said, for instance, an instruction from Rosenberg, minister for the Eastern Occupied Territories of Hitler's Germany, to the imperial authorized agent in the Baltic countries and Belorussia. "The Baltic Sea should become an inner German Sea under the protection of great Germany."

It is more than obvious that it is their joining the USSR that saved the nations of the Soviet Baltic region from fascist enslavement, but "overseas experts" stubbornly sidestep this fact. The "friends" of the Soviet Baltic republics keep mum also about how working people lived in the Baltic region before 1940, under the bourgeois system, when unemployment and poverty were rampant in Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. It is not for nothing, of course, that they keep silent about all this: they make their stakes first of all on the young, on those who either do not know the true national history or know it poorly...

Why have Western "Experts on the USSR" needed to falsify history so blatantly? What have they sought to achieve with their hostile historical excuses? The clamor raised by the foreign falsifiers and the ill-intentioned allegations they make about the "oppression" of the Soviet Baltic nations are meant to put a question mark over the choice made by these nations in favor of socialism and unity with the Soviet Union. [paragraph continues]

Certain circles in the West, which are unwilling to part with the dream of restoring the capitalist system to the Soviet Baltic region, are eager to distract Soviet people from constructive work and, if possible, to provoke nationalist escapades (or, still better, disorders) so that, by exploiting them, to propel the anti-Soviet campaign even further, besmirch the nationalities policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State, and sling mud at our restructuring drive and the democratization policy pursued by the party and actively backed by the people.

Sordid jobs, as a rule, are done in the West with the close involvement of secret services. In the current acts of ideological sabotage against the Soviet Baltic republics, one of the principal roles has been alotted to secret services, most notably the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, as well. It is the C.I.A. that has been coordinating subversive activities and fabricating all kind of mendacious pamphlets and leaflets smuggled into the Soviet Baltic region through agents. The so-called consulate-general of Estonia in New York, which is on the payroll of the C.I.A., in its booklet, for example, has called for "struggle for Estonia's freedom," while the "foundation" of terrorist Bukovskiy based in Amsterdam, Holland, and also funded by the C.I.A. has been coming up with falsehood after falsehood about "massive deportations from the Baltic countries occupied by Soviet troops."

Reactionary Baltic emigres have been especially zealous in their propaganda attacks on the Soviet Baltic region to the dictation of the C.I.A. a significant role among them belongs to former Nazi flunkeys and renegades of every stripe, who have betrayed their own peoples and act in the same fashion as Afghan anti-government bandits or Nicaraguan contras. It is appropriate to recall all this today for the sake of those gullible people who, through ignorance or thoughtlessness, may turn out blind weapons in the hands of well-paid C.I.A. agents.

Numerous letters are coming these days to Soviet newspapers and to TASS from members of the public, from workers, collective farmers and intellectuals in the Soviet Baltic republics. They express indignation at the instigatory activities of those Western circles who, after failing to find a crack in the socio-political unity of Soviet society, are attempting to split it along ethnic lines and sow seeds of enmity on our soil. This indignation cannot but be shared. These, however, are not the first attacks on the USSR and not the first encroachments on the unbreakable unity and friendship of the Soviet nations that have been mounted by socialism's enemies, but never have these attacks and encroachments brought any dividends to those making them. This will certainly be the case this time, too.

'Remaking History'

LD201627 Moscow TASS in English 1546 GMT 20 Aug 87

["If Lies Are Compared With Facts" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow August 20 TASS -- Commentator Yevgeniy Babenko writes:

At present certain quarters in the West engaged in giving propaganda backing to anti-Sovietism, and on their prompting nationalistic groups as well are again showing interest in the Soviet Baltic republics. For many decades radio stations on the payroll of known special services have slandered our recent history and distorted the truth about the equal membership of the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian peoples in the family of the USSR's peoples. Now they are diligently repeating their old allegations. For a pretext they are using the anniversary on August 23 of the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact between the Soviet Union and Germany in 1939.

It is alleged, for instance, that Lithuania was "coerced" into joining the USSR. The Soviet side has repeatedly dwelt on this matter with documents in hand. For us there is nothing that is not clear, deliberately confused or invented in it. But since our foes are raking up history with provocative purposes let us return in our minds to the situation that existed almost fifty years ago.

At the time Nazi Germany had already seized Belgium, Holland, almost the whole of France, Norway, Denmark, Greece and Yugoslavia. At the very same time on the strength of elections held in Lithuania on July 14-15, 1940, the citizens of that country virtually unanimously had declared for the socialist transformation of Lithuania and the closest alliance with the USSR. A week later, on July 21, 1940, the people's Sejm of Lithuania assembled for its first meeting in the building of the state theatre in Kaunas. On proclaiming its country a Soviet Socialist Republic the Sejm then turned to the question of the new republic's relationship with the USSR.

It was clear to the deputies that in the existing situation in Europe the proclamation of Soviet Government in Lithuania by itself could not guarantee the republic independence and a possibility of development in conditions of calm and dignity. Hitler's Nazism was becoming an ever more real and sinister danger.

The deputies from the Kaunas, Vilnius and Siauliai election districts conferred and stated:

"The introduction of Soviet power in Lithuania cannot yet provide a firm guarantee that it will be possible to safeguard Socialist Lithuania from any whatsoever imperialist encroachments on its existence. Having experienced foreign yoke and the hardships of war and occupation the Lithuanian people knows that such a guarantee of its existence can be given only by its joining of the fraternal family of the peoples of the Soviet Union". And so it happened.

Such are the facts, such is history. And those whose minds are rooted in the past, who dream of reviving the rule of the national bourgeoisie, of regaining the lost power and privileges will not succeed in remaking history.

IZVESTIYA ON AMNESTY FOR YOUNG OFFENDERS

PM201241 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Aug 87 Morning Edition p 6

[Unattributed report: "Amnesty"]

[Text] It is a terrible misfortune -- adolescents isolated in [correctional labor] colonies. It is our common blunder, mistake, and miscalculation. It means that the family has not performed its primordial educative role, schoolteaching has malfunctioned in a big way, and the "street" has been a stumbling block. It is a reproach to us all -- from careless parent to reputable ministers of education -- a reproach to society.

"Never mind!" cheerful voices say. "If you've stumbled, we'll support you. We'll send you off for rehabilitation [perekovka] to a correctional labor colony." But do we support them by "putting them away"? Of course, we'd like to think so. Although we often hear that a guy who has done his time returns as a skilled specialist in shady dealings, with a shattered life and a shaken state of mind. Do we, society, often peer across the threshold of this isolated world? What do we know about the storms raging there -- do they purify or pollute young hearts? It is certainly time to make that world -- for it is also ours and human -- open and overseen by more than just a single department...

An IZVESTIYA photographer recently visited the South Sakhalin Correctional Labor Colony. The amnesty announced in the country in connection with the 70th anniversary of Great October also applied to its "pupils." Deputy Oblast Prosecutor O. Kapliy, reading out the order, reminds the boys of the responsibility which now rests on their shoulders... Then a few minutes later at the entrance came the moving meeting with relatives whom it was at first difficult even to look in the eye.

I very much want to think that all they have experienced has purified these young people. I want to believe that the act of the highest humanity -- the amnesty -- will help them to return as soon as possible to society, will make waverers make a final correct decision, and will prompt the correction of those who are not to be amnestied...

Amnesty is a Greek word and means "forgiveness, oblivion." The motherland forgives you who have stumbled and is ready to forget the past. Here is your chance -- begin life anew today, especially as it all lies ahead of you.

But we adults -- from parent to minister -- we cannot, we do not have the right to, and we must not forget this lesson.

Otherwise it will all start over again.

REPORT ON JAN-JUL INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE

PM191351 Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 34, Aug 87 (Signed to Press 13 Aug 87) p 2

["USSR State Committee for Statistics Report" under headline: "On Industry's Work in January-July 1987" -- passages within slantlines published in boldface]

[Text] Seventy-two percent of industrial associations and enterprises coped in full with their contractual obligations in January-July this year. The output sales plan taking delivery commitments into account was fulfilled 98.4 percent.

Above-plan accumulations in industry as a whole amounted to R179 million during the first 6 months.

Industrial labor productivity increased 3.6 percent in January-July compared with the corresponding period last year. The growth of industrial output amounted to 3.5 percent.

The basic indicators in January-July 1987 for national economic /complexes/ are as follows (in percentages) [Columns in the following table represent: Column A -- Fulfillment of contractual commitments for output deliveries; Column B -- Proportion of enterprises failing to fulfill contractual commitments; Column C -- Shortfall in output deliveries, millions of rubles; Column D -- Fulfillment of profits plan (January-June); Column E -- Actual labor productivity growth rate; Column F -- Actual output volume growth rate]:

	A	B	C	D	E	F
Fuel and energy complex	99.2	35	243	108	3.8	3.1
Metallurgical complex	98.6	39	617	102	2.7	1.6
Machine building complex	96.9	61	1,751	96	2.5	2.8
Chemical industry and timber complex	97.8	53	1,252	97	3.8	2.9
Agro-industrial complex	99.4	20	365	99.4	4.0	3.8
Social complex (USSR Ministry of Light Industry)	98.6	33	756	97	3.3	0.4
Construction industry complex (USSR Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry)	98.5	34	111	102	3.9	2.5

Data on industry's work in January-July for /union republics/ (including industry under union jurisdiction) is cited below (in percentages) [Columns in the following table represent: Column A -- Fulfillment of contractual commitments for output deliveries; Column B -- Proportion of enterprises failing to fulfill contractual commitments; Column C -- Savings (plus sign -- denoted by letter "p" in table -- indicates overexpenditure) in prime costs as percentage of the plan (January-June); Column D -- Actual labor productivity growth rate; Column E -- Actual output volume growth rate]:

	A	B	C	D	E
RSFSR	98.3	31	0.2	3.9	3.3
Ukrainian SSR	98.3	27	0.01	3.1	2.6
Belorussian SSR	99.2	12	0.5	6.1	6.4
Uzbek SSR	97.8	29	0.7	-1.3	1.2
Kazakh SSR	97.8	26	0.3	3.5	3.7
Georgian SSR	98.6	14	p0.3	1.9	2.5
Azerbaijan SSR	98.2	24	p0.1	3.6	4.4
Lithuanian SSR	99.7	5	0.4	4.6	4.5
Moldavian SSR	98.8	27	0.4	8.4	8.3
Latvian SSR	99.1	19	0.6	3.9	3.2
Kirgiz SSR	98.4	24	p0.8	-0.3	0.4
Tajik SSR	97.9	30	0.9	2.9	5.2
Armenian SSR	97.4	25	0.3	2.7	4.2
Turkmen SSR	98.7	23	0.9	-1.3	-0.1
Estonian SSR	99.7	12	0.8	5.1	3.9

Output worth R60 million, representing 0.5 percent of the total volume of output submitted during July, was rejected by the state acceptance system, which has been introduced at 1,500 associations and enterprises.

Figures showing the production of the most important types of output in January-July by industrial complexes are cited below.

Fuel and Energy Complex [subhead]

	Produced in January-July 1987	Percentage plan fulfillment in Jan-Jul 1987	Jan-Jul 1987 as percentage of Jan-Jul 1986
Electricity, billion kilowatt-hours	960	100.5	104
Oil (including gas condensate), million tonnes	362	101	102

Gas, billion cubic meters	417	102	106
Coal, million tonnes	445	102	101

The January-July targets for the extraction and production of the most important types of fuel and energy resources were met. Above-plan extraction amounted to 4.3 million tonnes of oil, including gas condensate, and 7 billion cubic meters of gas. Enterprises under the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry extracted 9.8 million tonnes of coal in excess of plan. At the same time, 40 percent of coal extracting associations failed to cope with contractual commitments and the shortfall in output amounted to R78 million.

Metallurgical Complex [subhead]

	Produced in January-July 1987	Percentage plan fulfillment in Jan-Jul 1987	Jan-Jul 1987 as percentage of Jan-Jul 1986
Steel, million tonnes	94.3	100.3	100.4
Rolled ferrous metal products (finished), million tonnes	65.8	100.7	100.9
Steel pipes, million tonnes	11.7	102	100.8

Above-plan production amounted to 314,000 tonnes of steel and 479,000 tonnes of finished rolled metal products, and 2.3 million tonnes of iron ore were extracted in excess of the plan. While fulfilling the plan for the production of basic types of output within the consolidated product list (except for steel pipes), the industry failed to ensure the planned manufacture of output in the prescribed range, primarily highly efficient types of metal products. Production targets were not met for electric steel, rolled low-alloy steel, high-quality cold-drawn steel, curved steel sections, and cold-rolled sheet metal.

Machine Building Complex [subhead]

	Produced in January-July 1987	Percentage plan fulfillment in Jan-Jul 1987	Jan-Jul 1987 as percentage of Jan-Jul 1986
Turbines, million kilkowatts	11.3	98	107
Turbine generators, million kilowatts	6.9	85	77

Large electric machines, thousands	14.7	90	95
AC electric motors, million kilowatts	31.4	92	96
Low-capacity electric motors for program-controlled machine tools (stepper motors), thousands	27.7	97	104
Metal cutting machine tools, billion rubles	1.6	94	98
of which, with digital program control	0.8	103	105
Forging and pressing machines, million rubles	379	85	93
Industrial robots, thousands	8.5	102	94
Instruments, automation equipment, and spare parts, billion rubles	2.9	98	103
Computer equipment and spare parts, billion rubles	3.0	101	107
Program control devices for all types of technological equipment, thousands	15.7	96	106
Petroleum apparatus, million rubles	145	92	98
Chemical equipment and spare parts, million rubles	546	87	94
Industrial equipment and spare parts for the light and food industry, billion rubles	1.0	89	95
Tractors, million horsepower	30.1	93	94
Agricultural machines, billion rubles	2.4	99.6	103
Grain harvesting combines, thousands	57.3	101	82
Cotton harvesting machines, thousands	4.6	103	86
Potato harvesting combines, thousands	6.0	100.3	130

Machines and equipment for stockraising and feed production, billion rubles	1.7	91	99
Feed harvesting combines, thousands	23.4	87	103
Excavators, thousands	23.5	93	93

There was an increase in the manufacture of many types of advanced output -- metalworking equipment with digital program control, flexible production modules, specialized railroad cars, and advanced types of construction and finishing equipment.

At the same time, the production plan was not fulfilled by the USSR Ministry of Heavy and Transport Machine Building as regards metal rolling, blast furnace, and steel smelting equipment and diesel locomotives; by the USSR Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry as regards long-distance electric locomotives; by the USSR Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry as regards metal cutting machine tools and forging and pressing machines; by the USSR Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building as regards tractors and machines and equipment for stockraising and feed production; by the USSR Ministry of Machine Building for Light and Food Industry and Household Appliances as regards equipment for the light and food industries; and by the USSR Ministry of Automotive Industry as regards bearings.

Planned growth rates were not achieved in the manufacture of highly efficient advanced products -- electric motors in the new standardized AI series, program control devices for all types of technological equipment, machines and equipment for continuous casting of billets, and others. Disruptions in supplies of components manufactured and consumed primarily by enterprises within the machine building complex itself were not overcome.

Machine Building Complex [subhead]

	Produced in January-July 1987	Percentage plan fulfillment in Jan-Jul 1987	Jan-Jul 1987 as percentage of Jan-Jul 1986
Mineral fertilizers (in 100-percent nutrient equivalent), million tonnes	21.0	100.8	104
Chemical plant protection agents (in 100-percent active ingredients), thousand tonnes	199	100.8	99.6
Sulfuric acid, million tonnes	16.6	99	103
Caustic soda, million tonnes	1.9	98	101

Chemical fibers and yarns, thousand tonnes	885	99.8	103
Synthetic resins and plastics, million tonnes	3.2	98	102
Tires for motor vehicles, buses, agricultural machines, motor cycles, and motor scooters, millions	39.5	100	102
Commercial lumber (excluding small timber procurements), million trimmed cubic meters	178	99.1	99.8
Paper, million tonnes	3.6	99.8	99.4
of which newsprint, billion square meters	20.7	100.4	103

Planned production volumes were exceeded as regards mineral fertilizers, newsprint, polypropylene, fiberboard, large-size veneer sheets, and packaging cardboard.

At the same time, there was an increase in the shortfall that has been building up since the beginning of the year regarding production of PVC, polyethylene, thermoplastic pipes and pipeline components, paper, cement and shaving panels, and chipboard.

Construction Industry Complex [subhead]

	Produced in January-July 1987	Percentage plan fulfillment in Jan-Jul 1987	Jan-Jul 1987 as percentage of Jan-Jul 1986
Cement, million tonnes	79.6	100.8	102
Precast ferroconcrete, million cubic meters	71.7	99.7	103
Asbestos cement sheet (shingle), billion standard tiles	5.1	100.4	103
Soft roofing and insulation materials, billion square meters	1.2	99.2	99.3
Asbestos, million tonnes	1.3	101	104
Window glass, million square meters	145	98	97

The construction materials industry met its targets and, compared with January-July last year, growth was ensured regarding the production of the main types of output, except soft roofing and insulation materials and window glass.

There was, however, a lag in production of precast ferroconcrete, including panels and structures for large-panel housing construction, triple-layer panels with flexible connectors for outside walls in housing construction, and sectional buldings (modules) made of light metal components.

A considerable lag behind plan targets for large-panel housing construction was allowed to build up in July and since the beginning of the year by the USSR Ministry of Construction in the Eastern Regions of the USSR, the USSR Ministry of Construction in the Urals and West Siberia Regions of the USSR, the USSR Ministry of Construction in Southern Regions of the USSR, and the USSR Ministry of Construction in the Northern and Western Regions of the USSR.

The following figures describe the fulfillment of the plan for the production of /consumer goods/:

	Produced in January-July 1987	Percentage plan fulfillment in Jan-Jul 1987	Jan-Jul 1987 as percentage of Jan-Jul 1986
FOODSTUFFS [subhead, published in upper case]			
Meat (from state raw material resources), million tonnes	6.2	107	106
Sausage products, million tonnes	2.1	103	105
Butter (from state raw material resources), thousand tonnes	1,018	104	103
Wholemilk products in milk equivalent (from state raw material resources), million tonnes	18.9	105	104
LIGHT INDUSTRY PRODUCTS [subhead, published in upper case]			
Textiles, all types, billion square meters	7.3	100	103
Sewn goods, billion rubles	14.9	100.8	99.4
Knitted articles, million items	1,048	100.2	103
Hosiery, million pairs	1,174	101	104
Footwear, million pairs	472	100.3	101

GOODS FOR CULTURAL, EVERYDAY, AND DOMESTIC PURPOSES [subhead, published in uppercase]

Watches and clocks, millions	40.5	98	99.4
China and earthenware, million rubles	576	99.7	104
High-grade (glass and crystal) tableware, million rubles	504	99.6	89
Radio receivers, millions	4.7	93	91
Television sets, millions	5.0	89	91
of which, color sets	2.5	83	99.3
Tape recorders, millions	2.8	88	102
Refrigerators and freezers, millions	3.5	96	98
of which, two- and three-compartment units	0.7	91	145
Washing machines, millions	3.3	97	106
De luxe electric vacuum cleaners (USSR Ministry of Electrical Equipment Industry), thousands	103	91	153
Sewing machines, zigzag type, thousands	552	99.5	101
Furniture, billion rubles	5.0	100.4	104
Automobiles, thousands	774	100.2	100.3
Motorcycles, thousands	557	97	91
Wallpaper, million standard lengths	295	102	115
Single-axle MT3-0.5 power units (USSR Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building), thousands	4.8	105	105
Disposable paper products, million rubles	420	103	107

The total volume of consumer goods output (excluding alcoholic beverages) in January-July was R177 billion in retail price terms, which was 4 percent higher than in January-July last year.

Agro-industrial complex enterprises fulfilled the plan for the production of basic foodstuffs. The production of basic food industry products also increased in comparison with last year.

Compared with January-July last year, the manufacturer of liquor, vodka, and wine products fell by 18 percent. The manufacture of nonalcoholic beverages increased 10 percent and that of mineral waters increased 7 percent, but plan targets were not fully met.

Ministries producing household appliances failed to reduce the shortfall they have allowed to occur since the beginning of the year. According to the January-July results, the shortfall amounts to 633,000 television sets, 375,000 tape recorders, 366,000 radio receivers, 141,000 refrigerators and freezers, and 118,000 washing machines.

While meeting the targets for the production of basic types of output, associations and enterprises under the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Light Industry were responsible for a shortfall in deliveries of output to specific consumers amounting to R0.8 billion in January-July. Moreover, one in three of the ministry's associations and enterprises was in breach of contract commitments.

Many enterprises continue to manufacture sewn goods and knitwear, footwear, and other goods which are not in demand by the population and cannot be marketed.

SECURITY AT AIR BASES REPORTEDLY LACKING

AU201951 Paris AFP in English 1943 GMT 20 Aug 87

[Text] Moscow, Aug 20 (AFP) -- Security at some Soviet air bases is so lax that someone wearing a pilot's [as received] can simply enter unhindered, the Soviet Army newspaper RED STAR said here Thursday. The paper cited an incident in which one of its correspondents entered a base near Kiev, Ukraine, without passing a security check. Lieutenant Colonel S. Levitskiy, who works with the paper, said he crossed the air base limit "unhindered, my aviator's uniform being considered a 'pass'".

RED STAR regretted that "organization of the air bases' protection and defence is sometimes on the same level as in the first years after the war". The paper condemned the attitude which it said prevailed among air base officials that "air base defence is a secondary affair". This attitude was all the more alarming as "first strikes by the enemy are directed against air bases," as World War II and regional conflicts since have showed, the paper said.

In May, teenage West German pilot Mathias Rust was able to land a Cessna light aircraft unchallenged in Moscow's Red Square, in an incident swiftly followed by the sacking of the Soviet air defence chief.

YAZOV ISSUES ORDER FOR USSR AIR FLEET DAY

PM210909 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Aug 87 First Edition p 1

["USSR Defense Minister's Order of the Day No 224" dated Moscow, 16 August 1987]

[Text] Comrade soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and petty officers!

Comrade warrant officers and ensigns!

Comrade officers, generals, and admirals!

Comrade airmen and navigators, engineers and technicians, military and civil aviation specialists, aviation industry workers, and amateur fliers of the USSR DOSAAF!

Comrade students at aviation schools!

Comrade veterans of the aviation!

Today our country's working people and the Armed Forces servicemen are celebrating USSR Air Fleet Day.

The motherland of Great October honors its avaiators and lauds the combat and labor feats accomplished by them for the sake of strengthening its aviation might.

This holiday is being celebrated in an atmosphere of selfless struggle by Soviet people to implement the strategic course of the 27th party congress for accelerating the country's socioeconomic development and restructuring all spheres of Soviet society's life. The creative rhythm and the mood of businesslike efficiency were given a powerful boost by the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee January and June (1987) Plenums. The renewal of the style and methods of cadres' work and the radical reform of economic management and the country's entire national economy encourage initiative and quest among working people and Army and Navy servicemen.

Having launched a socialist competition in honor of Great October's 70th anniversary, aviation servicemen are tirelessly increasing their political and military knowledge, improving their air training and combat skills, and preparing to fittingly welcome the forthcoming jubilee.

Created and nurtured by Lenin's party, the USSR Air Fleet honorably performs its historic mission, has won the love and gratitude of our people, and has written numerous pages of glory in the annals of the world's first socialist state. During the grim years of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet aviation made a worthy contribution to the Soviet people's victory over the enemy.

At present, thanks to the tireless concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government and the persistent labor of scientists, designers, and all workers in the aviation industry, the availability of technical equipment for military and civil aviation is in line with modern requirements.

Under the conditions of persisting international tension and incessant attempts by the United States and NATO countries to break the prevailing equilibrium and achieve military-strategic superiority over the USSR and the Warsaw Pact, the paramount and most fundamental task of aviation servicemen is to further enhance vigilance and combat readiness and improve collaboration with all branches and categories of the USSR Armed Forces.

In combat collaboration with the personnel of Warsaw Pact states' armies, the aviation servicemen of the USSR Armed Forces are always ready to perform their patriotic and international duty in defense of the gains of socialism.

A worthy contribution to resolving the tasks involved in further boosting the Soviet Union's economic and defense might is being made by working people in civil aviation and amateur fliers of the USSR DOSAAF.

I greet and congratulate you on the holiday of the whole people -- USSR Air Fleet Day!

I wish the personnel of the USSR Armed Forces aviation to continue to persistently master the new aviation equipment and weapons; to improve their air, fire, and tactical training; to constantly boost their ideological tempering and psychological qualities; to strengthen service discipline by all means; to augment the combat might of the Soviet Air Fleet; and to be prepared to repulse any aggressor.

I wish aviation industry and civilian aviation workers new achievements in creating and efficiently assimilating modern aviation equipment.

I wish the fliers of the USSR DOSAAF success in developing aviation sports, improving young people's military-patriotic education, and preparing them for service in the USSR Armed Forces.

I wish aviation veterans success in educating the growing generation of Soviet people in the combat and labor traditions of the USSR Air Fleet.

To mark USSR Air Fleet Day, I order:

That a festive firework display be held today, 16 August 1987, at 2200, in the hero city of Moscow, capital of our motherland, in the capitals of the union republics, and in the hero cities of Leningrad, Volgograd, Odessa, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, Karch, Tula, Smolensk, Murmansk, and the hero fortress of Brest.

Long live our great motherland -- the USSR!

Long live the heroic Soviet people and their glorious Air Fleet!

Glory to the CPSU -- the inspirer and organizer of all our victories!

Army General D. Yazov, USSR Defense Minister

KOROLKOV WRITES IN TRUD ON AIR FLEET DAY

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[Article by Colonel General of Aviation B. Korolkov, first deputy commander in chief of the Air Forces, under the rubric "16 August is USSR Air Fleet Day:" "The Combat Wings of the Fatherland"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Contrary to the hopes of bourgeois strategists, our Air Force, like the Armed Forces as a whole, emerged from the war even stronger. Now the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are doing everything possible to ensure that the Air Force is always at a high level of combat readiness and is capable, together with other branches of the Armed Forces, of giving a crushing rebuff to any act of aggression, whatever its source. The scientific and technical revolution in our country has, without doubt, also had a full impact on the Air Force. The combat and flight performance of aircraft complexes has sharply improved. The Soviet Air Force incorporates virtually every achievement of technical progress: in engine building, aerodynamics, mechanics, thermal physics, and materials technology. Flight speeds have increased considerably in recent years. The "ceilings" of our supersonic aircraft now exceed dozens of kilometers.

Reports on the testing of a new heavyweight -- the Ruslan aircraft -- by the O.K. Antonov Experimental Design Bureau, in which V. Terskiy and his crew set a new long-distance flight world record, have aroused a great deal of interest in our country and abroad. The AN-124 is the aircraft which travelled 20,151 km on a closed route without landing in 25 hours 30 minutes and broke the record set by U.S. pilots 25 years ago in a jet-powered B-52N bomber. This, together with the fact that Soviet aircraft builders showed aircraft at the Le Bourget exhibition this summer whose creation seemed impossible 3 or 4 years ago, is evidence that Soviet aviation science and technology firmly hold leading positions in world aircraft construction.

What forms the basis of the Air Force's combat might? Primarily supersonic missile carriers and long-range heavy bombers. These aircraft's airborne missiles, including nuclear missiles, make it possible to strike the enemy's targets without entering the zone covered by his air defense forces. [paragraph continues]

Our supersonic, all-weather fighter aircraft can destroy enemy aircraft and pilotless aircraft using airborne missiles over long distances and engage in combat using guns, cannons, and missiles. [passage omitted]

Our holiday coincides with the busiest stage in the summer combat training period. Learning from the lessons of truth, we have no right to turn a blind eye to unresolved problems. Taking an exacting approach to the assessment of our achievements and in line with the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, which has examined the incident when the Soviet Union's airspace was violated, we are taking measures to decisively improve vigilance, combat readiness, and discipline in Air Force units and combat control bodies.

It should be pointed out that the progress made in restructuring in our units and formations still does not fully correspond to the spirit of the time. An effective mechanism of real acceleration in all aspects of life in military collectives has still not been created everywhere. Increased demands for the intensification of the training process meet with a formal response in some places. The questions of further strengthening military discipline and improving the work and increasing the responsibility of the administrative apparatus demand closer attention.

Air Force personnel are filled with determination in the year of the 70th anniversary of Great October to scale new heights in enhancing the Air Force collectives' combat readiness and further improving air, firing, and tactical training.